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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMATIC STATUS OF

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of

Oregon v Smith, the Supreme Court held that members of the
Native American Church were not constitutionally entitled to
ingest peyote as part of their religion's sacrament in the face of
an Oregon law outlawing the use of peyote.' Many aspects of the
Smith decision have been sharply criticized, but none so much as
the general view of religious exemptions announced by Justice
Scalia's opinion for the Court. Justice Scalia distinguished freedom of religious belief from behavior driven by religious belief,
and further distinguished laws directed at religion from general
laws that merely collide with behavior driven by religious belief.
That work done, Justice Scalia had a simple and flat response to
the constitutional claimants in Smith: religious believers have no
constitutional license to disregard otherwise-valid general laws
that conflict with the dictates of their religion.2
Smith sharply divided the Court on the question of extant
doctrine as to the constitutional status of religious exemptions.
Four of the justices--Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the
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An important theme of this essay is that religion does not exhaust the commitments
and passions that move human beings in deep and valuable ways. For us, the finest
reminder of this idea is the special place of Lori Martin and Jane Cohen in our respective
lives, and we accordingly dedicate this essay to them.
1 494 US 872, 890 (1990).
2 Id at 877-80.
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outcome only, and the three dissenting justices-were outraged
at what they saw as the Court's startling and unwarranted departure from settled doctrine. In their view, it had become a
commonplace of constitutional doctrine that only governmental
interests of "the highest order" could justify a state's interference
with religiously driven behavior.3 Justice Scalia and his colleagues in the majority saw matters very differently; for them,
the idea that religious motivation could exempt one from the
reach of an otherwise valid general law was wholly novel and out
of step with constitutional law and the rule of law generally.4
Actually, neither of these characterizations of constitutional
law ante-Smith was fair or convincing. Doctrine governing religious exemptions was in a shambles. In a small but durable line
of cases involving the entitlement to unemployment benefits of
persons whose religious scruples prevented them from working
on Saturday (Sherbert v Verner5 and its progeny) or from manufacturing armaments,6 the Court had consistently held that the
state could put people to a choice between their consciences and
material disadvantage only if its reasons for doing so were markedly weighty. But only in one case outside of Sherbert v Verner
and its unemployment benefits progeny had the Court actually
appeared to act on that principle: in Wisconsin v Yoder, it held
that Wisconsin's stake in requiring all children to pursue a recognized program of education until the age of sixteen was not
sufficient to justify the state's interference with the religiously
motivated commitment of the Amish to integrate children into
their working society at the age of fourteen.7 Everywhere else
there were strong indications that the Court could not in fact live
with the broad dictum of Sherbert.
In Reynolds v United States, it should be remembered, the
Court rejected not only the claim of the Mormons to a constitutional right to practice polygamy; it also rejected as unthinkable
the idea of each religious believer creating a microenvironment of
law molded to her separate beliefs.8 The cases that mediated
between Reynolds and Sherbert half a century later-notably

' Id at 892 (O'Connor concurring); id at 907-08 (Blackmun dissenting).
4 Id at 879.

' 374 US 398 (1963). See also Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission of
Florida,480 US 136 (1987).
6 Thomas v Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 US 707
(1981).
7 406 US 205, 207, 234, 236 (1972).
8 98 US 145, 166-67 (1898).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette9 and Cantwell
v Connecticut'---were certainly more sympathetic to religion
generally, but they were so fully wrapped with issues of free
expression as to deflect rather than answer the concern that
animated the Court in Reynolds.
In the Court's more modern experience, the Sherbert line and
Yoder emerge as exceptions rather than the rule: in some cases
since Yoder and outside the unemployment benefits area, the
Court has paid lip service to the Sherbert rule, but in each of
these cases it has found the compelling state interest test of
Sherbert satisfied." While in other constitutional areas the compelling state interest test is fairly characterized as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact," 2 in the religion cases the test is strict
in theory but feeble in fact. 3 Furthermore, even before Smith,
the Court had begun to find reasons for rejecting the Sherbert
formulation altogether in particular exemption contexts."
A candid assessment of the corpus of case law confronting
the Court in Smith would have emphasized disarray, not order.
And Smith itself, unhappily, did nothing to improve the situa9 319 US 624 (1943).
10

310 US 296 (1940).

" See Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 604 (1983) (government
interest in eradicating discrimination in education); United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260
(1982) (government interest in preserving a sound tax system); Johnson v Robison, 415
US 361, 385-86 (1974) (government interest in raising and supporting armies). In other
cases, the Court has rejected Free Exercise claims on the ground that the challenged practice imposed no actual burden upon the religious convictions of the claimants. See, for
example, Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectionAss'n, 485 US 439, 448-49 (1988)
(building road over sacred areas did not burden religious belief); Bowen v Roy, 476 US
693, 700 (1986) (requiring disclosure of a social security number for welfare benefits did
not burden religious beliefs); Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290, 304-05
(1985) (imposing a minimum wage requirement does not burden religious believers who
refuse, for religious reasons, to accept wages).
1 The phrase belongs to Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 (1972).
13 Ira Lupu, remarking upon the same point, calls the Free Exercise compelling state
interest test "strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact." Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With
Accommodation, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 743, 756 (1992). See also Robert D. Kamenshine,
ScrappingStrict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 Const Comm 147, 149 (1987) (noting the
inconsistency between the Court's rhetoric and its practice).
"4 See, for example, O'Lone v Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342 (1987) (compelling interest analysis not applicable to prison regulations); Bowen, 476 US at 708 (Burger plurality)
(when a challenged statute merely regulates the availability of government benefits,
neutral and uniform rules that burden religious beliefs are constitutional so long as they
are a reasonable means to promote a legitimate government interest); Goldman v
Weinberger, 475 US 503, 506-07 (1986) (compelling interest analysis not applicable to military regulations).
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tion. Neither the majority nor the dissenting positions in Smith
offered a view of the exemption problem that can at once explain
the distinct status of religion in our constitutional tradition, offer
a workable and attractive approach to the exemption issue, and
make more or less good sense out of the scattered pattern of
precedent.
What is needed is a fresh start. We need to abandon the idea
that it is the unique value of religious practices that sometimes
entitles them to constitutional attention. What properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their distinct value; and
what is called for, in turn, is protection against discrimination,
not privilege against legitimate governmental concerns. When we
have replaced value with vulnerability, and the paradigm of
privilege with that of protection, then it will be possible both to
make sense of our constitutional past in this area and to chart an
appealing constitutional future.
That is the project of this Article. We hope to demonstrate
that the privilege view of religious exemptions is normatively
unjustified and unattractive in its practical implications, while
the protection view is both justified and attractive in its consequences.
Groups will figure at several points in our discussion. The
predominance of groups in religious practice is important to the
understanding of both privilege and protection. Religious groups
are in some respects uncontroversially secure from the reach of
state command. For example, however committed we may be to
gender and racial equality, most of us do not imagine that the
state can tell a religious group that it must be indifferent to
gender or race in its choice of spiritual leaders. 5 This aspect of
our constitutional tradition may seem to support the idea that
religion is constitutionally privileged. Yet religion has no monopoly on barriers limiting the reach of state authority. We do not
imagine that the state could insist on gender or racial neutrality
in an individual's choice of her psychiatrist, lawyer, or intimate
friends. What makes religious practice distinct for these purposes
is not its value, but rather its structure: religion often involves
the extensive, communal enactment of behavior and relationships

" The view is not held unanimously. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and
Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination,67 BU L Rev 391, 439-40
(1987) (suggesting that churches that admit women to their congregation may be compelled to admit women to their priesthood).
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of the sort that ordinarily take place in far more cloistered, personal contexts.
While the group aspect of religious practice thus may produce false signs of constitutional privilege, it is a genuine element in the cultural dynamic that produces the need for constitutional protection. The solidarity and insularity of group membership and belief sustain the insistence of many religions on one
right God and one right way to homage and salvation-upon one
right and insular epistemology. It is the group identity of the
faithful that mobilizes pity, distrust, or even hatred for those who
are not believers.
Although we will ultimately return to offer some brief reflections on the relationship between religion and group rights, our
path to those conjectures will travel almost entirely through
territory dedicated to the problem of exemptions for religiously
motivated conduct. 6 That issue has recently taken on new significance. It is now apparent that Smith will not be the Court's last
word on this issue. Perhaps that was evident from the start, for
the Smith Court did more to underscore the disarray surrounding
the issue than it did to resolve any of the difficulties arising from
the clash between collective authority and individual religious
conscience. Recently, however, Congress's response to Smith has
further complicated matters. The President has signed into law
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,7 which passed

s Articles on this topic are, we admit, legion. Distinguished contributions to the literature before Smith include: John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious
Liberty, 18 Conn L Rev 779 (1986); Lupu, 67 BU L Rev 391 (cited in note 15); Ira C. Lupu,
Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv L
Rev 933 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S Ct Rev 1; and
Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76
Georgetown L J 1691 (1988). Smith precipitated a torrent of articles, virtually all of them
critical of the Court's ruling. A limited sampling of these essays includes: James D.
Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal L Rev 91 (1991); Abner S. Greene,
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L J 1611 (1993); Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause:The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation
of Religion, 140 U Pa L Rev 555 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109 (1990); William P. Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U Chi L Rev 308 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S Ct Rev 1; and a superb student work by James Ryan,
Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct: An IconoclasticAssessment, 78 Va
L Rev 1407 (1992). Despite all this scholarly attention, much remains to be said about the
exemptions problem. Of the works cited, only Marshall's directly challenges the assumption that religion enjoys a constitutional privilege. This Article's attempt to construct a
protection theory of religion's constitutional status is, so far as we know, unique.
7 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USCA § 2000bb (Supp
1994).
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both houses of Congress by overwhelming majorities."8 Essentially, the Act seeks to restore the status quo ante-Smith by subjecting laws that interfere with an individual's conformity to religious mandate to the compelling state interest test. The Act raises a variety of questions, not the least of which is how the Court
ought to respond to a congressional mandate predicated on an
infirm view of the state of constitutional law prior to the decision
in Smith. Before we can either assess the wisdom of the Act, or
try to imagine how the Court ought to respond to its
problematically framed mandate, we need to begin with the more
basic question of what the appropriate judicial response to constitutional claims for religious exemptions ought to be.
II. TWO MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: PRIVILEGE
AND PROTECTION

The vigorous pursuit of political justice in modern constitutional law has two great paradigms: the right of free expression
and the right of African Americans to equal protection. These two
traditions have dominated our modern constitutional sensibility,
and discourse about the propriety of vigorous judicial intervention on behalf of other values often proceeds by way of comparison to them. There is a structural difference between these two
pillars of constitutional justice, and understanding that difference
illuminates the claim that religion makes on our constitutional
judgments.
We have in mind the difference between the Constitution's
privileging persons or practices and the Constitution's protecting
such persons or practices. Speech is a practice that is privileged
in our constitutional tradition, indeed privileged to a high degree.
The state is often barred from restricting speech because of its
content, even when there is reason to suppose that important
concerns would be advanced if the speech in question were suppressed. In contrast, African Americans are not privileged, but
rather protected. Constitutional law struggles to abolish caste
and its residue, to secure for African Americans treatment as full
and equal citizens of our national community.
In our constitutional tradition, a claimant who locates her
behavior within the core of protected speech activity acquires the
privilege of immunity from the reach of governmental authority,
even under circumstances that would otherwise offer strong

"' See 139 Cong Rec H 2356-03 (May 11, 1993); 139 Cong Rec S 14471 (Oct 27, 1993).
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grounds for the exercise of that authority against her. She may
act in a fashion that increases the likelihood that injuries to the
property or persons of others may take place; 9 she may act in a
fashion that is itself injurious to others; she may even and especially act in a fashion that is injurious to the national interest as
it is presently conceived. Her behavior is privileged, as against
other behavior that shares these abstract features, and as
against the interests of those persons who may be injured by that
behavior."
A claimant who argues for exemption from the reach of state
authority on grounds of racial equality stands in a different posture. She is insisting on parity, not advantage: she demands that
the state behave in a fashion fully consistent with her status as
an equal citizen, as opposed to treating her as a member of a
subordinate class who by virtue of that membership does not
enjoy the same concern and respect. She invokes the Constitution
against subordination. She is asking for something that is in
principle the due of every member of our political community.
Her racial status is constitutionally distinct in the sense that it
marks her as vulnerable to injustice, to treatment as other than
an equal; her claim is for protection from that injustice.
Speech and racial equality are thus both treated distinctly
and favorably by virtue of their inclusion in the agenda of judicial enforcement of the Constitution, while other claims of political justice-most prominently those diverse claims we lump into
the broad category of "economic rights"--are excluded. But only
speech is privileged by the substance of the norms upon which
the constitutional judiciary draws when it acts. Put another way,
privilege and protection refer not to the fact of constitutional (or
judicial) priority, but to the grounds for such priority. A claim for
constitutional privilege requires a showing of virtue or precedence, while a claim for constitutional protection requires a
showing of vulnerability or victimization. The distinction between
privilege and protection is therefore ultimately a distinction in

19

See Brandenburgv Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969).

2 The observation that speech is privileged need not take any specific position among
the possible understandings of the structure of that privilege. The best account of constitutional justice, for example, might treat the ambition of securing an appropriate regime
of public discourse as lexically prior to other concerns of the state; alternatively, it might
treat that ambition as one entitled to special weight in an all-things-considered judgment.
In all probability, both of these metaphorical characterizations of the nature of speech's
privilege are radically oversimplified as against a more nuanced picture that is domain
specific. But the point is that the idea of privilege encompasses all of these meanings.
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constitutional objective. From the recognition of victimization,
and of vulnerability to future victimization, flows the constitutional objective of protection; while from the recognition of virtue
or precedence flows the constitutional objective of privilege.
The distinction between privilege and protection in constitutional justice cannot always be read from the surface of the rules
employed by courts to protect constitutional principles: the compelling state interest test, for example, figures in both speech and
racial equality doctrine. But beneath the facial rules of constitutional law, at the level of constitutional justice, the justification
for distinct constitutional treatment and the appropriate scope of
that treatment are different if the claim is one of privilege or one
of protection.21
In our constitutional jurisprudence there is no privileging of
persons; indeed, opposing caste or subordination is one of the
most robust projects of modern constitutional law. One might
think that the converse is also true: because protection flows
from a concern about vulnerability or victimization, it might
seem that only persons or groups, rather than activities, may be
the object of constitutional protection. But as religion itself vividly illustrates, individual and group identity can be defined by
shared commitments and practices. More to the immediate point,
persons and groups can be vulnerable to victimization by virtue
of their shared commitments and practices. The bitter divisions
of humanity along religious lines, and the global persecution of
religious minorities throughout most of recorded history, make
the victims of religious intolerance the ultimate and tragic exemplars of vulnerability.
Nevertheless, most modern commentary has proceeded on
the assumption that the constitutional status of religious exemptions rises or falls on the degree to which religious practices are

2
The priority of conflicting principles of constitutional justice does not turn on their
affiliation with privilege or protection. Thus, to observe that constitutional principle X is
founded on privilege, while constitutional principle Y is founded on protection, is not to
offer a view about how a conflict between these two principles ought to be resolved.
The distinction does not tidily map-as might first appear-onto the conventional
categories of liberty concerns and equality concerns. At the heart of speech doctrine is a
premise of viewpoint neutrality that sounds in equality rather than maximizing speech
opportunity, hence the great divide between viewpoint-specific regulations, which are
highly disfavored in our constitutional tradition, and time-place-and-manner regulations,
which despite occasional lapses of judicial rhetoric are widely tolerated. More deeply, the
best accounts of constitutional protection of speech may well depend largely on the connection between free expression and the fair disposition of conflicting interests and viewpoints among political equals.
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constitutionally privileged-privileged in the way, for example,
that speech is privileged. If religiously motivated people are to be
exempt from the application of laws that they would otherwise be
required to obey, it is assumed, this must be because religion is
esteemed by the Constitution in a way that most other human
commitments, however intense or laudable, are not.22
Indeed, though sharply divided in all other respects, the
majority and minority factions in Smith' tacitly agreed that
arguments about religious exemptions should turn on concerns of
privilege. The argument in Smith thus assumed an all-or-practically-nothing form, with two losing sides. Consider the view of
the minority: anytime the otherwise valid, general laws of the
state collide with significant religious obligations, the religious
obligations prevail unless the law in question can be shown necessary to achieving a compelling state interest. 24 This is the
same presumptive invalidity that attaches to laws that make
facial distinctions adverse to racial minorities and to laws that
imperil concerns close to the core of free expression. In the words
of Justice O'Connor, the minority view of religious privilege was
as strong as the majority view was barren:
The compelling interest test effectuates the First
Amendment's command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that
the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty,
whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests "of the highest order."'

An important exception is William Marshall, who denies that religion enjoys any
constitutional privilege. See, for example, Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 320-21 (cited in
note 16) ("[Religious belief cannot be qualitatively distinguished from other belief systems
in a way that justifies special constitutional consideration."). Marshall's view of the proper
scope of constitutional-priority protection for religion may be narrower than the one we
advance here. See, for example, William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled FreeExercise Exemption, 40 Case W Res L Rev 357, 360-61 (1989-90) (arguing that the Free Speech Clause limits the scope of constitutionally compelled accommodations). Our argument, which embraces the principle we call "equal regard," preserves a
distinct set of exemptions that protect, without privileging, religious belief.
' Smith yielded three opinions: a five-Justice majority opinion by Justice Scalia, a
concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, and a three-Justice dissent written by Justice
Blackmun. We are including Justice O'Connor in the "minority" for these purposes because the doctrinal and analytical foundations of her concurring opinion are fully aligned
with those of the dissenting Justices.
24 Smith, 494 US at 893-95 (O'Connor concurring); Id at 908-09 (Blackmun dissenting).
Id at 895 (O'Connor concurring), quoting Yoder, 406 US at 215.
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Much more needs to be said before we can fully respond to this
view, but for the moment, the majority's unease is understandable: in a world and a country of great religious diversity,
the faithful are invited to replace the collective self-rule of democracy with individual self-rule whenever their religious consciences direct them to do so, unless the collective authority of
the state is founded on the bedrock of critical interests of "the
highest order."
The majority view was no more appealing. For the majority,
the distinct constitutional status of religion rather mysteriously
runs out once the state frames its laws in terms of general application.2 ' Explicit religious tests, and direct, intentional intervention in the circumstances of worship, continue to be strongly
resisted, but there the sharp constitutional concerns for religion
come to a stop. On the majority account, even the Sherbert line
seems imperiled, or at very best relegated to an exceptional category more or less hand-tailored to unemployment insurance cas27
es.
The inability of either faction of the Smith Court to arrive at
an attractive and persuasive view of the exemption problem suggests that the paradigm of privilege itself is deeply misdirecting
as a guide to religious liberty in general, and to the problem of
religious exemptions in particular. A closer look at the privileging
view strongly confirms this initial assessment.

III. THE CASE AGAINST THE PRIVILEGING VIEW OF
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
A. The Privileging of Religion Made More Precise: Unimpaired
Flourishing
The underlying logic of the privileging view of religious exemptions is this: It is a matter of constitutional regret whenever
government prevents or discourages persons from honoring their
religious commitments; accordingly, government should act so as
to avoid placing religious believers at a substantial disadvantage
by virtue of their efforts to conform their conduct to their beliefs.
This is the principle of unimpaired flourishing.
The principle of unimpaired flourishing is at the heart of the
minority Justices' view in Smith, where it sponsored Justice
O'Connor's ringing announcement that only governmental inter-

26

494 US at 879.

27 Id at 882-83.
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ests "of the highest order" could justify interference with religiously motivated conduct.' It is also common to the discourse
of those commentators who argue for generous religious exemptions. Michael McConnell, for example, holds that "[tihe purpose
of free exercise exemptions is to ensure that incentives to practice
a religion are not adversely affected by government action. " '
Unimpaired flourishing is sometimes offered as a principle of
equity, as though it functions merely to make those who respond
to the strong demands of their religious beliefs no worse off than
others. But unimpaired flourishing is different than that: it privileges religious commitments over other deep commitments that
persons have. Members of our political community are not generally entitled to governmental arrangements that enable them to
honor their important commitments without being placed at a
substantial disadvantage. If somebody-say, Vincent-is above
all committed to his art, and consumes his waking hours in devoted concentration to creating art, he is behaving in a manner
that many would approve. Vincent is not, however, entitled in
principle to arrangements that spare him the diverse costs of this
behavior: Vincent is not entitled to an economic structure that
permits him to prosper; Vincent is not entitled to collect unemployment insurance if he is by virtue of his passion unavailable
for work; Vincent is not entitled to consume peyote even if, like
Coleridge, he does his best work in an altered state of consciousness; Vincent is not entitled to bring toxic paints vital to the full
realization of his artistic vision into his locality in the face of
local environmental laws prohibiting their possession and use.
We may believe that some personal commitments deserve
special support, of course, like a parent's decision to remain at
home with a newborn child for the first several months. This
means we believe that child care under these circumstances
should be privileged as against other commitments (as a matter
of sound legislative judgment rather than constitutional dictate).
Thus unimpaired flourishing, transposed to this context, would
require fully paid parental leave. That is just the point. Unimpaired flourishing is a privileging principle-providing certain
parents a benefit because they decide to remain home for a socially preferred reason, rather than for some other reason-even
though it only leaves its beneficiary no worse off by virtue of
engaging in the privileged conduct.

Id at 895 (O'Connor concurring).
McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1146 (cited in note 16).
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We have selected unimpaired flourishing to represent the
privilege view of religious freedom because it captures the normative essence of the positions advanced by the most thoughtful
partisans of a robust view of religious exemptions. In our discussion, however, little will turn on this precise formulation.
Most if not all privilege views have this in common with unimpaired flourishing: they regard state interference with the observance of religious commandments as a constitutional vice that
the state must avoid whenever it can do so without imperiling its
most basic goals and obligations. Our evaluation of unimpaired
flourishing will apply more or less in full to any formulation that
shares this conceptual ground.
B. Unimpaired Flourishing Applied
Welfare-driven measures of justice have an endemic normative burden: idiosyncracies in the welfare functions of some individuals will support extreme and intuitively discreditable demands on social resources on their behalf--demands that seem to
contradict the underlying project of securing justice. Thus utilitarians have to contend with the theoretical possibility of "welfare monsters," whose joyous consumption makes the marginal
utility of giving them more and more greater than the marginal
utility of helping anyone else, including those who are significantly worse off materially. And welfare egalitarians similarly
have to contend with hungry elites, upon whom some combination of nature and nurture has imposed the awful burden of being even marginally content only when gorged with caviar and
quail eggs.3"
As a conception of religious freedom, unimpaired flourishing
presents a striking variant on this normative difficulty. Religious
belief need not be founded in reason, guided by reason, or governed in any way by the reasonable. Accordingly, the demands
that religions place on the faithful, and the demands that the
faithful can in turn place on society in the name of unimpaired
flourishing, are potentially extravagant.
Religious belief can direct parents to withhold medical assistance from their children, or adults to withhold such assistance
from one another or to refuse such assistance for themselves. It

'o See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10
Phil & Pub Aff 185 (1981) (critiquing theories of welfare equality), and especially id at
228-40 (discussing the problem of expensive tastes).
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can direct believers to maintain great caches of weapons against
Armageddon; to give over their underage children for the sexual
gratification of their religious leaders in the meantime; to spend
all of their waking hours in arcane study, eschewing all other
occupations; to follow dietary regimes that call for refined and
expensive foods; or to ingest substances plausibly regarded by
secular society as radically poisonous, dangerous, and habituating. Religion can demand sacrifices that range from vows of abject poverty, to the regular undertaking of expensive pilgrimages,
to the ritual slaughter of species protected on grounds of civility
or threatened extinction. It can underwrite employment practices
that secular judgment would regard as grossly exploitative and
dictate the subordination of women, persons in particular racial
or ethnic groups, or homosexuals. To be at peace with their religious consciences, the faithful may require that public streets be
closed to vehicular traffic on the Sabbath; that particular sites be
preserved and freely accessible for their holy worship; and even
that the basic institutions of their society be pervasively arranged in conformity with their religious precepts.
The potential of religious beliefs to be arbitrarily demanding,
to be greedy in their demands on both the individual and the
society committed to the unimpaired flourishing of its religiously
faithful, is compounded by the possible all-or-nothing quality of
religious dictates. In other domains, well-being is generally incremental-having the requirements of well-being partially satisfied
is a benefit. But religious demands can be absolute or categorical.
They can assume the form: "A, B, and C must all be fully in place
or you are condemned to eternal damnation."
The principle of unimpaired flourishing, as a result, commends a vision of a world that is unrecognizable, unattractive,
and ultimately incoherent. In this world, the faithful would be
licensed to do as their faith requires, with little regard for the
consequences as seen from the vantage of secular society. In this
world, wealth would be distributed so as to support comfortably
those whose religious commitments diverted them from remunerative pursuits, or otherwise required great investments of time
and money. In this world, the faithful whose beliefs so required
would receive disproportionate authority over decisions about the
use of collective authority. The chaotic picture that emerges is
ultimately incoherent in this sense: the demands of one faith
would ultimately extend so far as to come into sharp conflict with
the requirements of other religions, and some mechanism, presumably secular, would have to arbitrate.
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But, of course, no proponent of the constitutional privileging
of religion actually means to take us into this ungainly world.
Significantly, almost all judges and commentators who urge
something like the principle of unimpaired flourishing nevertheless want collective authority in the United States to remain
pretty much as it is; they merely want to find a haven for religiously motivated conduct at the margins of state authority. This
produces incoherence of a much more immediate and troubling
sort: proponents of unimpaired flourishing are in the unhappy
position of offering an unexplainably selective, comparatively
modest, practical agenda for reform, on the basis of a sweeping
and deeply radical principle of political justice. The result is an
analytical scramble. Various limitations are offered, often in
combination.' Religiously motivated acts that harm others, it is
sometimes suggested, may be curtailed by state law, but the
state may not interfere with religious believers on paternalistic
grounds. As to the support of religious believers who cannot earn
or must spend as a consequence of their beliefs, a baseline
grounded, in effect, on the existing distribution of wealth and
opportunity is urged, and claims to improve on the status quo for
needy religious believers are disavowed. Or, it is suggested, secular needs must be balanced against religious needs.
These attempts to rescue unimpaired flourishing from its
own logic are unsatisfying. If religious motivation signifies legal
immunity only at the margins of state authority, there is good
reason to suppose that in these cases we are actually responding

31 Not surprisingly, proponents of privilege have trouble coming up with any satisfac-

tory formulation for their position. See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U Chi L Rev 115, 168 (1992) ("[The Religion
Clauses... guarantee a pluralistic republic in which citizens are free to exercise their
religious difference without hindrance from the state (unless necessary to important
purposes of civil government).") (emphasis added); id at 169 ("The underlying principle is

that governmental action should have the minimum possible effect on religion, consistent
with achievement of the government's legitimate purposes.") (emphasis added); id at 170

(endorsing the "compelling interest test"). In our view, this riot of standards is not mere
rhetorical slippage but an inevitable byproduct of any theory that accords religion a
privileged constitutional status. Because there is no coherent normative justification for
privileging religion, there is, of necessity, no principle to govern the balancing called for
by the "compelling state interest"-or any other-formula. Of course, McConnell is right
when he says, in the midst of announcing these competing standards, that "[n]o doctrinal

formulation can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining when the
government's purpose is sufficiently important, when its chosen means are sufficiently
tailored, or when the effect of the action on religious practice is sufficiently minor or
indirect." Id at 169. But the fact that we must make hard judgments about what is

"sufficient" does not eliminate the need for a defensible standard against which to judge
sufficiency.
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to well-founded-if inarticulate-doubts about state authority in
general rather than to the needs of religion in particular. On this
account, if we valued liberty in general to the appropriate degree,
there would be no need for the additional feature of religious
motivation to enter the story. This may well be the best way to
understand Yoder. Parents who have a systematic, reflective, and
durable scheme for educating their children may be entitled to
substitute their curricular judgment for the state's-at least at
the margin. If so, then Yoder may have been correctly decided; if
not, then the religious basis of the Amish approach to education
ought not matter.
Indeed, important constitutional benefits depend upon our
willingness to recognize this connection between specifically religious interests and more general principles of privilege. Religious
groups perform a valuable service in a freedom-loving society:
they push at the margins of liberty. But that service is best realized when the regime of law refuses to privilege religion, so that
the systematic but idiosyncratic impulses of organized religion
act on behalf of us all when they help to maintain or expand the
ambit of constitutionally secure choice.
Tests that purport to balance secular and religious needs
against each other are at best fronts for more substantive but
obscure intuitions about how particular claims for religious exemptions ought to come out. What exactly can such tests for
religious exemption mean? Are they meant to be restatements of
an overall utilitarian calculus of the form: do we improve utility
overall if we pursue Legal Rule A over Legal Rule B, or vice
versa? If not, what possible meaning can they have? One is left
with nothing but a fictive interest group deal in which religions
get "something" but not "too much." And if, on the other hand,
utilitarian calculus is indeed the core of the proposed balance,
this approach seems at once to have read the principle of unimpaired flourishing entirely out of the equation and to have reduced the issue of exemptions to one of social policy that legislatures are best able to determine.
Beset by these difficulties, judges and commentators who
favor some form of constitutional privilege for religion have taken
refuge in the compelling state interest test. The compelling state
interest test is normally applied in constitutional contexts where
practically all instances of collective behavior with the triggering
feature are expected to be unconstitutional, but extraordinary
cases can be imagined that would have the triggering feature but
not fail constitutional scrutiny. Though seldom applied literally,
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and hence an imperfect guide to what actually distinguishes the
extraordinary case, the compelling state interest test, with its
strong presumption against validity, seems a reasonably useful
banner under which to conduct analyses in cases of this sort.
Explicit racial distinctions that disfavor racial minorities provide
the classic example.
But in many religious exemption cases, the presumptive
invalidity implicit in the compelling state interest test is misplaced. There is a substantial range of religiously motivated
conduct-readily observable in contemporary national experience
-that quite clearly must yield to conflicting secular laws. This
has tacitly been recognized by the all-but-total failure of
Sherbert's dictum to travel outside the unemployment benefits
situation. As we have noted, the Supreme Court has paid lip
service to that standard in some non-Sherbert exemption cases,
but found the test satisfied in all except Yoder. That experience
could merely reflect the distortions of a small sample, of course,
were it not for the fact that the courts of appeals have similarly
applied the test in words only, and so found a diverse set of garden-variety legislative interests powerful enough to overwhelm
the claims of religious exemption." Under these circumstances,
the compelling state interest test becomes just another balancing
test, obscuring rather than clarifying analysis. Its invocation here
threatens to dilute the meaning of the test in its other, more
proper, applications.
To this point, we have focused on the unattractive consequences that would follow were we to take the principle of unimpaired flourishing to heart. The difficulty with that principle only
deepens when we consider what drives the impulse to treat religious practice in this special and favored way in the first place.
C. The Normative Difficulties of Unimpaired Flourishing
1. The sectarian defect.
In a liberal democracy, the claim that one particular set of
practices or one particular set of commitments ought to be
privileged (as we have used that term) bears a substantial burden of justification. As we shall see, the background circum-

' See generally Note, 78 Va L Rev 1407 (cited in note 16) (describing the poor track
record of Free Exercise claims in the federal courts of appeals). See also EEOC v Townley
Engineering& Mfg. Co., 859 F2d 610, 625-29 (9th Cir 1988) (surveying Free Exercise decisions by the federal courts).

1994]

ProtectingReligious Conduct

1261

stances-that religion is singled out for distinct and emphatic
treatment in the text of the Constitution, that many of the colonists fled religious persecution under circumstances that would
have made religious liberty vital, that there are various features
of religious liberty in our working constitutional tradition that
seem at once important and well settled-do not in themselves
support the proposition that religion ought to be privileged. An
attractive and full account of religion's place in our constitutional
tradition can proceed from protection rather than privilege.
Justification for the privileging of religion must proceed on normative grounds.
Religious believers have available to them one particular
justification along these lines: "Our God's commands," they might
say, "are the highest commands; we must answer to them in
priority to the mundane commands of the State." This is
straightforward enough, and might be a good reason for privileging religion in a monistic society of shared religious belief. Note,
though, that the constitution would privilege only "our" religion,
not religion generally. Our God speaks to (the hypothetical) us
with binding normative authority, and nothing more need be
said. Our God's authority does not give us a reason for privileging anyone else's religious commitments. Indeed, the sorry world
history of religious conflict suggests that one religion's belief
system might give it a singularly ferocious reason to impeach the
authority of another religion's belief system. Certainly there is
nothing in this line of speculation that resonates with the themes
of diversity and tolerance that are integral to our constitutional
tradition generally and our tradition of religious liberty in particular.
We can remake the religious believer's claim, to turn outward in a reciprocal spirit more suitable to liberal
constitutionalism in a plural society: "God's commands are the
highest commands. We should recognize that there are other
religious groups who believe that their 'God' is the true God, and
who take themselves to be bound to the word of their 'God' as we
are in fact bound to God's."3 3 In a society that was deeply plural
as among divergent religious beliefs, but nonetheless remarkably

Michael McConnell takes a position of this kind when he recommends as a constitutional principle the proposition that "[e]ven the mighty democratic will of the people is,
in principle, subordinate to the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual conscience." Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1516 (1990).
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monistic in the view that there was a god-or the normative
equivalent, from whom or which binding precepts emanated-this would be a basis for the constitutional privileging of
religion, perhaps. But we are not such a society; there are many
persons in our society who are not religious at all, and many
others who are not religious in the pertinent sense-that is, who
do not understand their lives to be ordered such that their highest commitments are to a set of religious commandments.
In a nation with many groups, many values, and many views
of the commitments by which a good life is shaped, the shared
understanding among some groups that they are each bound by
the commandments of a (different) god they believe deserves/demands obeisance is unacceptably sectarian as a basis for
the constitutional privileging of religion. Their claim, as a union
of groups within a broader, pluralistic society is no different in
principle than the sectarian claim of the religious believer we
first considered, who reasoned, wholly from within his own religious tradition, that his God was the true, supreme god, and thus
the state must permit each believer in the true God to subordinate the state's commands to those of God. As against the artist
for whom art is the highest command of life, the activist to whom
the pursuit of racial justice is all, or any of us who happen not to
be members of the union of the deeply religious, the members of
the union have no reason to offer, from within their own beliefs,
for the privileging of their commitments that the rest of us lack
with regard to our deep commitments.
2. Two nonsectarian strategies.
There are, however, two arguments for the constitutional
privileging of religion that do not suffer from this sectarian defect. The first appeals to persons within our political community
to recognize-from the outside, in effect-the anguished state of
the religious believer who is under state fiat to behave in a way
that flatly contradicts the demands of her religion. The second
suggests that organized religion enables our society to maintain
an important place for the moral, non-self-regarding aspects of
life.
One version of the first argument asks us to consider the
potential stakes for the religious believer of disobeying her God's
commandments. They may be such that it is an understatement
to speak of them as matters of life and death; they may be no
less than eternal paradise or damnation. We cannot be expected
to act as though those are the stakes, of course, but we can ap-
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preciate the unhappy state of someone who regards them as the
stakes. This seems an unpromising way to put the case. It asks
us to assume-in a way that seems especially inappropriate
when it comes to matters spiritual-that self-interest rather than
conscience is the stronger human drive. It expects us to treat the
religious believer's very long-term (possibly abstract, metaphorical) self-interested reasons for obedience as motivationally more
powerful than other persons' immediate self-interest and driving
passions-the deeply devoted artist, the parent with a hungry
child, or the lover overwrought with love, who are driven to disobey the law. Furthermore, it asks us either to treat all religions
as having the structure of eternal reward/punishment because
some do, or to parse among religions on this peculiar ground.
Interestingly (and this may not be a criticism), it also asks us to
accept as true for the believer that heaven and hell are at stake,
while holding to the contrary as a matter of our own belief. Unless we tacitly deny the truth of the believer's perspective in this
ironic way, the believer's situation may not seem so dire: she has
only to suffer mortal punishment in exchange for eternal paradise.
The better version of this first argument for privileging religion emphasizes mortal conscience rather than eternal consequences. It encourages us to see that the religious believer is in
the grip of conscience-a motivation that is at once powerful and
laudable-and to regard that circumstance as grounds for excusing her from obedience to laws that force her to choose between
her conscience and her well-being at the hands of the state. But
while conscience is the better motivational grounds for privileging religion, there remain persuasive objections to the claim.
Again, religious conscience is just one of many very strong motivations in human life, and there is no particular reason to suppose that it is likely to matter more in the run of religious lives
generally than will other very powerful forces in the lives of both
the nonreligious and the religious.
This is not to trivialize religious interests. We have no trouble agreeing with Douglas Laycock when he argues that it would
be an error to maintain that "[a] soldier who believes he must
cover his head before an omnipresent God is constitutionally
indistinguishable from a soldier who wants to wear a Budweiser
gimme cap."34 Likewise, we agree with Michael McConnell that
a Saturday work schedule imposes qualitatively different burdens

'

Laycock, 1990 S Ct Rev at 11 (cited in note 16).
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on those who "like to go sailing on Saturdays" and those who
"observe the Sabbath" on that day.85 But these comparisons
largely beg the question. Of course, burdens upon religious practice differ from burdens upon tastes in fashion and recreation. Do
they also differ from the considerably more weighty burdens
imposed by secular commitments to one's family, or by secular
moral obligations, or by physical disabilities?3 6
Consider two cases:
(1) Goldman is an army officer. His faith requires him to
wear a yarmulke. The yarmulke is inconsistent with the
Army uniform. The Army insists that Goldman must resign
his commission or comply with the uniform regulation. The
Army relies entirely on its interest in uniform appearance; it
does not contend that Goldman's obligation to wear the yarmulke will in any other way impair his performance.
(2) Collar is an army officer. He has a rare skin disorder on
his neck that prevents him from wearing a tie. Army uniform regulations require that all officers wear ties on certain
occasions. The Army insists that Collar must resign his
commission or comply with the regulation. The Army relies

McConnell, 59 U Chi L Rev at 125 (cited in note 31).
3' McConnell has recognized the relevance of such analogies. To distinguish laws that
disproportionately disadvantage members of a specific race from laws that disproportionately disadvantage members of a specific religion, McConnell has argued:
Religion is more like handicap than it is like race ....If the paradigmatic instance
of race discrimination is treating people who are fundamentally the same as if they
were different, the paradigmatic instance of free exercise violations or handicap discrimination is treating people who are fundamentally different as if they were the
same.
Michael McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1140 (cited in note 16). Yet, although McConnell
invoked the analogy between religion and handicap tojustify treating religious believers
differently, he did not consider the negative implications of the analogy: if the Constitution permits government discretion to decide when to accommodate handicaps, does it also
permit equal discretion with respect to religious accommodation?
Some writers have suggested that religious belief imposes unique burdens because
religious believers are, or ought to be, disabled from advancing their religious interests
through ordinary political processes. See, for example, Greene, 102 Yale L J 1611 (cited in
note 16) (making an argument of this variety). But clearly, religious believers to date have
not been barred from active participation in popular politics-see, for example, text accompanying notes 116-35 (discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and
other legislative efforts at accomodation)--and, while the question is beyond the scope of
this essay, we are not attracted to the claim that they should be so barred. For further
relevant argument by one of us, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious
Liberty in the ConstitutionalOrder,89 Nw U L Rev (forthcoming Winter 1995) (criticizing
doctrinal restrictions on religious argument in public debate).
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entirely on its interest in uniform appearance; it does not
contend that Collar's disability will in any other way impair
his performance.
Should we regard Goldman's interests as more weighty than
Collar's? Does the Army have a constitutional obligation to accommodate Goldman's religious burden if it accommodates
Collar's disability, or vice-versa? To maintain that the Constitution privileges religion, we would have to uncover some ground
for constitutionally favoring Goldman's interests over Collar's, a
ground that is not impermissibly sectarian or partisan; and that
is precisely what is lacking in the case for privileging religion.
The second nonsectarian argument for the constitutional
privileging of religion appeals to our desire as a society to remain
alive to the moral, non-self-regarding aspects of life, and sees
organized religion as a taproot of this vital aspect of human
flourishing. But while religion sponsors the highest forms of
community, compassion, love, and sacrifice, one need only look
around the world, or probe our own history, to recognize that it
also sponsors discord, hate, intolerance, and violence. Religion is
enormously varied in the demands it places on the faithful. As
we observed earlier, religious faith or belief need not be founded
in reason, guided by reason, or governed in any way by the reasonable. Religious commandments can be understood as inspired
by beneficent forces that are beyond human comprehension or
verification, or by the result of the spite, play, accident, or caprice
of entities or forces that do not necessarily hold human welfare
paramount. The only limitations are those of the human imagination or the range of divine circumstance (depending on whether
one looks from within or without religious beliefs): the bounds of
the former are very broad indeed, and the logic of the latter implies the absence of any bounds whatsoever. We mention all this
because, while the commitment to forces outside and above ourselves seems an attractive human capacity and impulse, the
substance of the commitment matters, and there is no warranty
on the laudability of religious commitments.
We must remember that the claim for the laudability of
religious commitment is offered as a reason for exempting behavior that defies otherwise valid general laws. This simple fact is
prejudicial to abstract arguments for the virtues of religious conscience. If we believe in a given case that the polity's decision to
enact a law was sound, the claim that a conscientious defiance of
this same law is virtuous requires some moral gymnastics. There
are situations in which our own ambivalence or distaste toward
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the necessary makes it possible to hold these two views simultaneously. The draft is a good example. We go to war with great
moral unease. At best, the intentional killing of soldiers and
civilians seems justified rather than just. In such a case, we can
sensibly believe that the conscientious dissenter is a morally
attractive figure, epiphying the moral regret that we ourselves
feel and hope not to lose, even as we conscript thousands and
calculate how to destroy our enemy. But this is a special case,
and we would be mistaken to extrapolate from it to a general
view about religious conscience.
Religions, of course, are by no means the only sources of
moral reflection and impulse; nor are moral reflection and impulse the only forms of elevated human activity. These are not
small quibbles to be worked out empirically. They go very much
to the heart of the objection to privileging religion. A plural democratic society like ours must develop constitutional principles
that recognize that a citizen's ability to contribute to the regime
does not depend upon membership in any particular religion, or,
indeed, upon religiosity at all. To hold otherwise would simply be
another way to insist upon the truth of a particular religion, or to
deny the truth of secular ethics. Of course, it might be true, as a
contingent empirical matter, that religious faith correlates well
with civic virtue, even if there is no theoretically necessary relationship between the two. But that sort of contingent empirical
connection between religious belief and constitutional objectives
is not an appropriate ground for privileging religion.
Once we have agreed that society must respect the virtue of
individuals without regard to their religious beliefs, the claim
that religion so breeds virtue that it is constitutionally privileged
becomes indefensibly partisan among conflicting views of what is
valuable in life and how that which is valuable is best realized.
We use the term partisanhere, rather than sectarian as before,
because there is a difference between the argument that God's
commands are prior to those of the state and the arguments we
are considering now. The nonsectarian arguments are available
to a person from outside religious belief, unlike the sectarian
claim for obeisance. But they are nevertheless inconsistent with
our constitutional tradition, which contemplates a modern,
pluralistic society, whose members find their identities, shape
their values, and live the most valuable moments of their lives in
a grand diversity of relationships, affiliations, activities, and
passions that share a constitutional presumption of legitimacy.
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To observe that the burden or nobility of religious belief
offers no grounds for constitutionally privileging religion is not to
deny the capacity of legislative bodies to accommodate religious
beliefs or even help religious institutions to prosper, where good
reasons exist for so doing. Some scholars mistakenly find traces
of constitutional privilege implicit in the very idea of religious
accommodation. McConnell, for example, writes: "There is no way
to distinguish between government action that treats a religious
belief as worthy of protection, and government action that treats
a religious belief as intrinsically valuable. Why accommodate
religion unless religion is special and important?"" But, as our
analysis suggests and as McConnell himself elsewhere recognizes, 38 religious obligations in some respects resemble physical
disabilities." Both religious obligation and physical disability
may make it hard for individuals to comply with otherwise neutral laws. We may make exceptions to accommodate the welfare
of the religious or the disabled, even if we wish such exceptions
were unnecessary. Nonsectarian judgment comfortably supports
the conclusion that for some people under some circumstances
the demands of religious belief are "special and important" in the
same sense that disabilities are "special and important": both can
have profound effects upon individual well-being. But it does not
follow that either religious beliefs or disabilities are "intrinsically
valuable." Likewise, policy makers might legitimately take into
account the instrumental value of religious institutions as aids to
moral development in a democratic society. But, at most, this argument simply indicates that we should think carefully before
reading the Establishment Clause to fetter legislative discretion
to advance religion where it is judged to have nonsectarian social
utility.

McConnell, 59 U Chi L Rev at 151 (cited in note 31).
See McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1140 (cited in note 16).
3' John Garvey has taken this idea still further by offering the provocative suggestion
that the law's treatment of insanity may in some respects be the best model by which to
understand the constitutional treatment of religious belief. Garvey, 18 Conn L Rev at 798801 (cited in note 16). The analogy is easy to overstate: obviously, we do not, and ought
not, consider religious belief a matter of regret in the way that we quite rightly consider
insanity a matter of regret. Nevertheless, in some settings, Garvey's startling comparison
does help us to understand the exemption problem.
',
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3. Generalized versions of the claim for privileging: If you
can't beat 'em ....
Thus far, our objections to privileging religion have shared a
common theme: they have emphasized the sectarian or partisan
character of the arguments on behalf of religion. This raises the
possibility that a constitutional privilege for religion could be
rehabilitated if it were generalized to include a wider range of
human commitments and thus avoid the complaints of sectarianism or partisanship. The idea would be to privilege all acts of
conscience, not merely those that are rooted in a conventionally
religious system of belief.
The difficulty with this approach becomes clear when we try
to give content to the idea of conscientious commitment. Need a
conscientious commitment be framed in recognizably moral
terms? Does it require a system of belief, or can it be simply a
sharp impulse? Need it involve an element of sacrifice? On the
one hand, if we try to contain the idea of conscience within relatively narrow bounds, we will encounter our old difficulties of explaining why a particular form of commitment should be treated
differently from comparably gripping life projects. On the other
hand, if we broaden conscience to include a great swath of the
deep commitments people hold, we face the fantastic idea that it
is a matter of constitutional regret whenever an otherwise valid
law collides with the commitments of an individual or group.
Our best account of a general privileging of conscience would
understand the key term, conscience, as follows: An important
mark of a well-formed person is an internal gyroscope that pulls
her toward doing the right thing and away from doing the wrong
thing. As right and wrong are understood here, self-interest-in
an immediate, material, short-term sense-is only coincidentally
congruent with rectitude. The tug of this gyroscope toward the
right thing is consciously experienced, but in many forms: as raw
impulse, as deep but unlocated conviction, or as fully articulate
and located within a scheme of belief. The provenance or bona
fides of this tug is similarly and associatedly diverse: if it is consciously acknowledged at all, it may range from the command of
a deity, to the interpreted understanding of a covenant, to a
mystic and intuitively driven sense, to a constructed and coherent, but free-standing system of moral judgment. Under some
circumstances-chronic and life shaping, or acute and focused-this pull toward rectitude becomes a central, dominating
feature of a person's motivation and self-identity. When these
circumstances obtain, and a person acts on them, she is perform-
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ing an act of conscience. Acts of conscience, on this account, are
what should be constitutionally privileged.
We have tried in this account to offer a generous conceptual
platform on which to found the privileging of conscience, but the
problems of justifying such a privilege remain. As with religion
more narrowly, we have to separate the general appeal of people
being motivated by conscience from the content of their conscientious motivations. It is surely a good thing that people have such
motivations, and we can imagine totalitarian legal regimes that
would deform and destroy this capacity. But a constitutional
privileging of conscience is not what divides us from such a regime.
As to the substance of acts of conscience, it by no means
follows from the internal phenomenology of conscience, which has
rectitude at its core, that we should be optimistic that conscientious impulses will lead persons to do good things. Both good and
evil can emanate from conscience: the feeding of the poor, perhaps, but also the purification of the caucasian race. Again, it
must be remembered that conscience is being offered here to
license the defiance of otherwise valid laws. Perhaps the claim is
essentially one of deep sympathy for the person caught between
the demands of her conscience and the demands of her state. But
we must still justify constitutionalizing sympathy for the strong
pull of conscience over the pulls of love, passionately demanding
life projects, and the infinitely creative demands of strong psychological compulsion.
Of course, as we note below, settled and attractive constitutional doctrine does in fact privilege a broad variety of conduct
that is relevant to conscientious commitments. Issues of conscience play an important role in decisions about family,
friendship, belief, and expression, and these decisions receive
constitutional privileging through doctrines like privacy, autonomy, and speech. Could not we describe this congeries of constitutional values, all of which bear some connection to moral identity,
as the province of conscience? And would not it then be obvious-albeit tautological-that the Constitution privileges conscience? Indeed, we might proceed even more boldly and say that
these constitutionally privileged aspects of human conduct are all
"religious" because they involve persons in the kinds of questions
that are an important focus of religious concern. Having so generously redefined religion, we could conclude that it is indeed privileged by the Constitution.
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Well ... fair enough. No doubt the truth of any proposition
depends upon how one defines the terms composing it, and there
is not much point to insisting upon strict standards of right and
wrong in a matter so thoroughly conventional as the definition of
words. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to decline this
definitional gambit. Most important, it utterly fails to advance
our discussion. The religious-exemption issue we have been considering begins at precisely the point where the general shield of
private behavior leaves off. If we elide religion with these other
matters already more or less uncontroversially shielded by the
Constitution, then we need new language to address the question
of what we have heretofore been calling religious exemptions. We
gain nothing here, and may in fact cause conceptual mischief
elsewhere: using religion or even conscience to redescribe values
like privacy or autonomy may badly unsettle our understandings
of the Establishment Clause.
D. The Failed Argument from Text and History
Often, proponents of a privileging view claim that a simple
textual or historical argument distinguishes burdens upon religion from even serious impositions upon secular well-being. This
argument sets normative concerns aside and claims a legislated
privilege, even in the face of normative difficulties. The Constitution is thus read like a tax code or a treaty, the meaning of which
is historically located, recoverable, and articulate to the question
of privilege. But neither the text nor the history of the founding
(even were we to concede that the founding is the only or most
relevant historical period) enables us to choose between privileging and protecting accounts of religious liberty. We believe this
state of affairs reflects more general truths. The text of the Constitution is seldom if ever dispositive of interesting constitutional
questions. Neither is the history. It is conceptually impossible
that the complex social and legal events surrounding the founding could answer hard questions without a normative view to
guide the interpretive enterprise. As we and others have argued
elsewhere,4" the project of constitutional interpretation involves
the pragmatic pursuit of political justice, not the positivist recovery of fixed historical meaning.
40 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 34-57 (Harvard, 1985); Lawrence G. Sager,

The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 NYU L Rev 893, 953-59 (1990); Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the ConstitutionalRelation Between Principle
and Prudence, 43 Duke L J 1, 3-18 (1993).
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The constitutional treatment of religious liberty is no exception to that lesson. Efforts to privilege religion on the basis of
purely textual or historical arguments fail to withstand scrutiny.
Consider, for example, the line of argument taken by Douglas
Laycock:
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the
founders thought so. The proper relation between religion
and government was a subject of great debate in the founding generation, and the Constitution includes two clauses
that apply to religion and do not apply to anything else. This
debate and these clauses presuppose that religion is in some
way a special human
activity, requiring special rules appli41
cable only to it.
Understood as a stark argument from text on behalf of the privileging of religion, this is singularly unconvincing. Religion is
indeed "special" in the following two ways: (1) religious activities
are more important than matters of fashion or recreation, such
as wearing a "gimme cap" or sailing; and (2) people are especially
likely to undervalue, or persecute, religious activities different
from their own. These differences justify constitutional protection
of religion against discrimination.42 But they provide no ground
for privileging religion by comparison to comparably serious secular commitments. Considered as freestanding fragments of constitutional text, the Religion Clauses are at least as congenial to
protection as they are to privilege. Given two available readings
of these clauses, it seems perverse to prefer the privileging view,
which, as we have seen, is normatively unattractive and inconsistent with the thrust of our constitutional commitments.
Even if we imagined, for the sake of argument, that the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment should be read to privilege religion, we still would have to account for the subsequent
impact of the Equal Protection Clause, which might have equalized (among other things) religion and nonreligion, and thereby
Laycock, 1990 S Ct Rev at 16 (cited in note 16). Laycock continues, "To distinguish
between a yarmulke and a gimme cap is not to discriminate between indistinguishable
head coverings, but to distinguish a constitutionally protected activity-religious exercise-from an activity not mentioned in the Constitution." Id. As indicated above, distinguishing between a yarmulke and a gimme cap is a matter of simple common sense.
Laycock's textual argument seems, however, to reach harder cases as well, since, for
example, neither physical disabilities nor the family receive explicit mention in the
Constitution.
42 William Marshall makes the same point. Marshall, 58 U Chi L Rev at 325 (cited in
note 16).
4
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deprived religion of any special constitutional respect it had enjoyed before Reconstruction. 4' From a purely textual standpoint
(which we do not commend), this argument seems especially
important with respect to cases involving state law, since the
Free Exercise Clause does not mention the states, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not mention religion.
Laycock's references to the founding generation shade from
text into history, and some commentators have made similar
arguments in more unambiguously historical terms. Probably the
most richly documented attempt to derive the principle of unimpaired flourishing from history is Michael McConnell's; his failure illustrates why history cannot dispose of the questions that
concern us.
McConnell's extensive research into the origins of the Free
Exercise Clause contrasts Thomas Jefferson's views with James
Madison's. According to McConnell, Jefferson took an
"'Enlightenment-Deist-rationalist' stance toward religious freedom,"" and "never once showed concern for those who wish to
practice an active faith."45 For Jefferson, "liberty of conscience
meant largely freedom from sectarian religion, rather than freedom to practice religion in whatever form one choose s."46
McConnell argues that Madison was more sympathetic to the
demands of religious practice. Madison never displayed
Jefferson's "disdain... for the more intense manifestations of
religious spirit."47 According to McConnell, Madison's "more affirmative stance toward religion" led him to "advocate [ I a jurisdictional division between religion and government based on the
demands of religion rather than solely on the interests of society."
McConnell believes that "[n]o other figure played so large a
role in the enactment of the Religion Clauses as Jefferson and
Madison."4 9 We might reasonably conclude that the serious divergence between the views of these two pivotal thinkers renders
history an unreliable guide to interpretation of the Religion

"' William Marshall has also drawn attention to the possibility that the Equal Protection Clause has superseded or altered the Religion Clauses. Marshall, 40 Case W Res L
Rev at 374 (cited in note 22).
4' McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1452 (cited in note 33).
'6

Id at 1453.

46

Id.

41 Id at 1452.
48 Id at 1453.
49 Id at 1455.
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Clauses. We might also suspect that, as has already been suggested, the Equal Protection Clause may be as important as the
Religion Clauses. The intentions of Jefferson and Madison have
no bearing on that clause's meaning.
McConnell, however, presents a historical argument purporting to show that "Madison, with his more generous vision of religious liberty, more faithfully reflected the popular understanding
of the free exercise provision that was to emerge both in state
constitutions and the Bill of Rights."" Even if we suspend
doubts about this claim, and even if we ignore complications
introduced by the Fourteenth Amendment, McConnell's history
does not resolve the questions we posed earlier when comparing
the cases of Goldman (the military uniform yarmulke claimant)
and Collar (the military uniform medical claimant). There is
more than one way to reject Jefferson's disdain for religion. At a
minimum, the Madisonian position (as McConnell describes it)
prohibits us from disparaging Goldman's beliefs. If confronted
with a soldier who simply dislikes the idea of wearing a uniform,
we might say that her problem is her own fault. If confronted
with a soldier who (to borrow Laycock's hypothetical) is inordinately fond of a Budweiser promotional hat, we might say that
his preferences are trivial. We cannot say either of those things
about Goldman. But this "more affirmative stance," which recognizes the "demands of religion," need not lead us to prefer
Goldman's claims to Collar's. For just as we must recognize that
Goldman's claims are neither blameworthy nor trivial, the same
is true of Collar's. Even if we set Madison up as the unique arbiter of the meaning of the Religion Clauses, ignore the Fourteenth
Amendment, and blind ourselves to the normative difficulties of
privileging religion, McConnell's history can not bring us to unimpaired flourishing.
E. Misreadings of the Status of Religion in Our Constitutional
Tradition
1. Uncontroverted elements of (religious) liberty.
Much of the appeal of unimpaired flourishing or other privileging views of religious freedom comes from the observation that
our constitutional tradition does seem to exempt religious belief
and certain aspects of religious practice from the reach of state

so Id.
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authority. This much seems common ground: Persons are entitled
to their religious beliefs and cannot on account of those beliefs be
punished or deprived of benefits otherwise their due; further, important aspects of religious practice-for example, the choice by a
religious group of their compensated spiritual leaders-are largely beyond the reach of the collective authority of the state. What
may seem to follow is that religion is systematically valued both
in our constitutional tradition and in our best understanding of
political justice in a way that should carry over to the question of
exemption from otherwise valid general laws. On this account, it
seems arbitrary and wrong to deny religion in the exemption
context the special status it is acknowledged to enjoy elsewhere.
But this is a misreading of the common ground where religious belief and certain elements of religious practice are beyond
the reach of collective authority. The best explanation for each of
these attractive limits on state authority does not involve privileging religion. We can see this if we consider each in turn a
little more closely.
Consider first the observation that persons are, in a deep
sense, entitled to hold their particular religious beliefs. No one
may be punished for her religious beliefs; or made to affirm other
beliefs; or denied the opportunity to discuss and publish her
beliefs; or prevented from associating with others to reflect upon,
celebrate, and consummate their beliefs in (otherwise benign)
ceremonies of affirmation or worship. All this is true, and sits
high in the pantheon of constitutional truths; but none of it is
distinct to religious belief. We have in our constitutional tradition
a strong freedom of belief, famously invoked by Justice Jackson
in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette:
-If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.5 '
Our freedom of belief extends to political, aesthetic, and
moral matters, to matters that are areligious and antireligious. It
is certainly true, for example, that belief in an orthodox deity
cannot be made a condition of public office; but neither can belief
in the virtues of religion generally, or belief in the falsity of reli-

"' 319 US 624, 642 (1943).
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gion, or belief in the virtues of maintaining an open mind to
religion, or belief that religion is worth worrying about, or belief
in the justness of capital punishment or the redistribution of
wealth, or belief in the comparative genius of Van Gogh and
Giorgione, or belief in the likelihood that the Higgs particle actually exists and will help us unravel the secrets of the universe. It
bears emphasis, if we have somehow failed to make the point,
that these beliefs are privileged not on analogy to religious beliefs, or on the view that they occupy the same role in the lives of
the persons who hold them as do religious beliefs, but on the simple and sufficient ground that they are beliefs, and that our political community deeply respects the capacity of its members to
arrive at and champion their individual understandings of the
world.
Consider next the observation that important religious practices have a distinct status in our understanding of constitutional
justice, as illustrated, for example, by the widely held view that
it would be constitutionally inappropriate to apply Title VII prohibitions of race and sex discrimination to the employment of
religious leaders such as priests, pastors, or rabbis.5 2 Here, the
story is a little more complex, but ends in much the same way as
did our observations about freedom of belief. We have in our constitutional tradition-in clear spirit, and if not in clear letter,
only because the occasions to spell the point out have not often
arisen-an important, morally indispensable sense of the private
and the public. Thus, the state can tell us whom we must accommodate at our lunch counters, but not at our dinner tables. The
question is not one of "state action," but of state authority, and it
does not turn on an obtuse, clunky view that private and public

52 Title VII, of course, exempts religious organizations from the statutory provisions

prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of religion. See 42 USC § 2000e-1
(1988). See also Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos, 483 US 327 (1987) (upholding
the constitutionality of this exemption). Surprisingly, Title VII contains no express exemptions whatsoever for race discrimination or sex discrimination by churches. Douglas
Laycock has accordingly concluded that, constitutional considerations aside, "the Act
forbids the requirement that Catholic priests be male." Douglas Laycock, Towards a
General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right
to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum L Rev 1373, 1375 (1981). Federal courts confronting this
issue have implied an exception or ruled the statute unconstitutional. See, for example,
McClure v Salvation Army, 460 F2d 553 (5th Cir 1972) (implied statutory exemption
permits religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of sex in some circumstances).
See also Laycock, 81 Colum L Rev at 1375-76 (summarizing cases). The Supreme Court
has not spoken to the issue directly, but it has suggested that the First Amendment
would protect church autonomy. See, for example, NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 US 490, 504, 507 (1979).
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can be mechanically or sweepingly distinguished. But the distinction exists, and it may ultimately be the most important
source of liberty there is. The state cannot insist that we ignore
the race or religion of potential marital partners, or prescribe
how our spouses and we divide up our household responsibilities,
but it can and must protect marital partners from the abuse of
their spouses. The quality of public and private is nuanced to
domain and demand.
Often, private behavior takes place in private places and in
private ways: classically, in the home, with relationships born of
love, respect, and duty, not contract and compensation. Public
behavior finds its most common venues in more widely accessible
spaces. One form of public behavior is largely economic; it centers
around the office, factory, hotel, or restaurant, and its most common mode is the commercial transaction, the exchange of goods
or services for money. Another form is political; it transpires
most frequently in assembly halls, streets, and newspapers, and
its common modes include the vote and the argument.
Often, but not always. Organized religious activity projects
distinctly private behavior into public space and involves distinctly private relationships that are bound by contract and compensated by dollars. Religious leaders are moral advisors, confidants,
friends, and spiritual guides. The state cannot prescribe a nondiscriminatory protocol for a group's choice of the person who is to
bear this private responsibility to its members any more than the
state could prescribe such a protocol for the selection of a psychiatrist, or of a neighbor in whom to confide one's hopes and concerns. The aspects of religious practice that are uncontroversially
secure from the reach of some state commands are so secure
because they are private in general and recognizable ways, not
because they are religious.
There are, of course, aspects of all these relationships-priest/parishioner, psychiatrist/patient, friend/friend-that
are appropriately vulnerable to state regulation. A religious
group may be restrained from making a child its leader under
circumstances threatening to the child's well-being, or enslaving
or otherwise coercing the service of its adult religious guide, or
beating or starving her in the name of ecstatic insight.
The controversial aspect of religious exemptions begins at
precisely the point where the general shield of private behavior
leaves off. In the present state of constitutional law, persons are
not entitled to consume banned drugs like peyote alone in the
privacy of their homes, or with good friends who join them in a
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search for enlightenment through altered states of consciousness;
willing partners are not entitled to enter into polygamous or
polyandrous marriages; parents are not allowed to determine
that the best possible education for their teenage children is full
integration in the adult life of their family and community (if the
state insists on a higher minimum of formal education); and a
man who quits his job because he wants to be with his ailing
wife on Saturdays is not thereby constitutionally entitled to continued qualification for unemployment insurance. Hence,
Smith,5 3 Reynolds,' Yoder,5" and the Sherbert56 line are the
cases that we must address. Analysis of them cannot borrow from
situations where religious behavior derives constitutional solicitude from the general privilege available to private conduct, including private conduct that takes place in public settings.
2. The Sherbert Quartet.
Sherbert and the short but durable line of cases that follow
its lead are widely perceived as supporting the privileging view of
religious freedom. In each of these cases, the Court held that a
religiously motivated person was constitutionally entitled to retain her eligibility for state unemployment insurance, notwithstanding her observation of the Sabbath 7 or scrupled refusal to
work in the manufacture of armaments." Sherbert was the first
case to assert that laws interfering with religiously motivated
conduct must be analyzed under the compelling 'state interest
test.5 9 While that promise is largely unfulfilled in other contexts,
Sherbert itself has never been directly questioned by the Court
and enjoys widespread support in critical commentary. On the
privileging account, Sherbert is taken at its most literal and expansive word: most of us, most of the time, must take laws as we
find them, but when we act in response to the dictates of our
religion, the laws must yield to us unless they are crucial to very
important state interests.

494 US 872 (1990).
98 US 145 (1878).
5 406 US 205 (1972).
374 US 398 (1963).
' Id at 410; Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,480 US 136,
140-41 (1987).
' Thomas v Review Board of the IndianaEmployment Security Division, 450 US 707,
709 (1981).
59 374 at 406-07.

1278

The University of Chicago Law Review

[61:1245

In Smith, justices on both sides of the exemption issue
seemed to agree-at least tacitly-that Sherbert must be understood as privileging religion in this way. The four justices who
resisted the majority approach to religious exemptions rested
their case squarely on Sherbert; and Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, struggled unconvincingly to confine a privileging
view of Sherbert to the unique circumstances of the unemployment insurance cases."' Commentators on the exemption problem largely replicate the binary structure of disagreement among
the justices in Smith: either Sherbert is right and religiously
motivated conduct prevails against all but the most compelling of
state interests, or Sherbert is wrong, and religiously motivated
conduct is not so privileged, bringing serious constitutional scrutiny to an effective close.
Neglected on all sides is an understanding of Sherbert that
depends on the protection of minority religious believers rather
than the privileging of religiously motivated conduct. Government need not sympathize with religious interests to accommodate them. That much is clear from our attitude toward physical
disabilities: we certainly do not consider disabilities beneficial to
society, but we believe it wrong to hold the disabled responsible
for their condition and believe that the government should do
something to make their lives easier. Likewise, even those who
consider religiousness a matter for regret might nevertheless
support accommodation because it makes religious individuals
happier. Of course, the existence of individual interests in accommodation does not by itself generate a constitutional claim. What
transforms religious accommodation from a mere policy concern
to a constitutional issue is the vulnerability of religion to prejudice and persecution.
Seen through the lens of protection, the Sherbert Quartet
ceases to be an anomaly in the jurisprudence of religious freedom
and the Constitution more generally, and stands as precedent for
a more reasonable and nuanced view of the exemptions issue. In
Sherbert itself, South Carolina's violation of norms sounding in
protection was transparent, and was an explicit and important
element in the Court's opinion. Ms. Sherbert was a Sabbatarian,
whose unavailability for work on Saturdays was treated by the
state as making her ineligible for the receipt of unemployment

- Smith, 394 US at 893-95 (O'Connor concurring); id at 908-09 (Blackmun dissenting).
61

Id at 883-84.
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benefits. But South Carolina had a Sunday closing law, so that
mainstream religious believers were not put to the painful choice
between fidelity to the commands of their religion and eligibility
for important state benefits in hard times. Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan emphasized this disparity in circumstance:
Significantly South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday
worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which we
here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty. [Justice Brennan here quoted the South Carolina statute favoring Sunday worshippers.] No question of the disqualification
of a Sunday worshipper for benefits is likely to arise, since
we cannot suppose that an employer will discharge him in
violation of the statute. The unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the
religious discrimination which South Carolina's general
statutory scheme necessarily effects.62
The choice of Sunday as a uniform day of rest is itself constitutionally provocative, but we are concerned now with a different
point. South Carolina's election of Sunday, placed side-by-side
with its refusal to accommodate the needs of Sherbert and other
Sabbatarians to decline Saturday employment, gives one
overwhelming reasons to suppose that the state has disadvantaged a vulnerable group.
Thomas v Review Board of the IndianaEmployment Security
Division is less obviously a case of religious discrimination; it too,
however, is best understood in this way. 3 Thomas was a
Jehovah's Witness who worked in a foundry of a large munitions
company. When he was transferred from the foundry to a department that manufactured turrets for tanks, his religious scruples
made it impossible for him to continue, and he resigned. Indiana
refused to pay him unemployment benefits, on the ground that he
had resigned his job without good cause. Unlike Sherbert, in
Thomas there was no facial disparity in the treatment of mainstream and minority religious beliefs. But like all the unemployment benefits cases, Thomas involved a state administrative
hearing and an individuated judgment that Thomas's religious
' Sherbert,374 US at 406. By saying that the Sunday exception "compound[s]" South
Carolina's constitutional delict, Justice Brennan suggests that a constitutional problem
would exist even absent the statute's express favoritism. We believe that this transparent
favoritism strengthens the underlying constitutional claim, but-as our analysis of Thomas makes clear-we agree that it is not essential to Sherberts constitutional argument.
0 450 US 707 (1981).
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scruples did not constitute "good cause" for his resignation. Here
there is good reason to suppose that Thomas's nonmainstream
religious reason for quitting his job was inappropriately devalued
as against other nonreligious and religious reasons. It is hard to
imagine, for example, that Thomas would have been refused
benefits had he resigned because of a serious allergy to the metal
used in tank turrets; yet Thomas did have a serious allergy, a
moral allergy to the job he was being asked to perform. It is also
hard to imagine that if Thomas had been an orthodox Jew who
was transferred to the pork-tasting division of the large company
where he worked that Indiana would have found a lack of good
cause in his refusal to continue.6 A state that puts in place a
discretionary process to assess reasons for quitting work, and
then turns a deaf ear to adherence to religious commandments as
good cause, opens itself to the conclusion that it is not giving
equal regard to the deep religious commitments of
nonmainstream religious believers.65
The two remaining cases in the Sherbert Quartet-Hobbiev
Unemployment Appeals Commission66 and Frazee v Illinois Department of Employment Security67 -fit this analysis nicely. Like
Sherbert and Thomas, Hobbie and Frazee arose after state administrative officials refused to recognize a religious objection as
"good cause" for quitting a job. In Hobbie, the Court held that it
did not matter that the claimant's obligation resulted from a
recent change in her religious views.68 In Frazee, the Court held
that the claimant was entitled to the benefits of Thomas even
though his religious views were independent of any sect.6 9 Both
' It seems clear from Indiana case law that a medically verifiable, job-specific harm
would constitute good cause for quitting a job. Two interesting precedents are Long v
Review Board, 150 Ind App 516, 276 NE2d 881 (2d Div 1971) (alleged psychic and physical harms resulting from workplace harassment did not constitute good cause for quitting
because the harms had not been medically verifiable), and Dormeyer Industries v Review
Board, 133 Ind App 500, 183 NE2d 351 (1st Div 1962) (religious harassment of Catholic
worker deemed good cause for quitting). See also Geckler v Review Board, 244 Ind 473,
193 NE2d 357 (1963) (emotional distress resulting from employment relationship did not
constitute good cause for quitting where the distress was a consequence of "purely personal and subjective" elements of the employee's psyche). In our brief survey of Indiana case
law, Dormeyer was the only pre-Thomas benefits case that applied the "good cause"
standard to reasons related in any way to the employee's religious beliefs.
6
Of course, the state might also inappropriately devalue other, secular reasons that
would justify an employee's decision to quit a job. For a discussion of other claimants who
might successfully invoke constitutional norms sounding in protection, see Section IV.C.
68 480 US 136 (1987).
6' 489 US 829 (1989).
6 480 US at 144.
' 489 US at 834.
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results flow naturally from the logic of protection: neither conversion nor idiosyncracy renders a religious interest less fundamental to the believer or less vulnerable to prejudice.
To those who have become accustomed to the idea that
Sherbert carves out a preferred place for religion, our reinterpretation of these cases may be surprising. The argument is not
unprecedented, however. Indeed, important elements of it have
figured prominently in the opinions of some Supreme Court justices. In United States v Lee, Justice Stevens observed that treating a "religious objection to the new job requirements as though
it were tantamount to a physical impairment that made it impossible for the employee to continue to work under the changed
circumstances could be viewed as a protection against unequal
treatment rather than a grant of favored treatment for the members of the religious sect." ° And in Bowen v Roy, Chief Justice
Burger's plurality opinion distinguished Sherbert and Thomas on
the ground that where a state has "created a mechanism for
individualized exemptions[,] ... its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent.'
We should note in passing that protection also explains the
result in Thornton v Caldor,Inc.,72 a case that, viewed from the
standpoint of privilege, might seem out of harmony with the
Sherbert Quartet. Connecticut passed a law requiring all employers to permit their religious employees to take their day of worship off from work. Caldor, Inc., which had refused to let
Thornton off work on Sundays, challenged the constitutionality of
Connecticut's accommodation. The Court sided with Caldor. If the
Sherbert Quartet were about privileging religion, this result
might seem hard to fathom. Connecticut may have singled out a
religious observance for favorable treatment when compared to
secular practices, but that legislative preference seems unobjectionable from a constitutional perspective if the Constitution
itself privileges religion.7 3 When we change perspective from
70 455 US 252, 263-64 n 3 (1982) (Stevens concurring). In Hobbie, Justice Stevens
concurred on the ground that Florida had regarded "religious claims less favorably than
other claims" so that Court intervention was "necessary to protect religious observers
against unequal treatment." 480 US at 148, quoting Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 707 n 17
(1986) (Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the result).
71

476 US at 708.

72 472 US 703 (1985).

" Even those sympathetic to the privileging of religion might condemn the Connecti-

cut statute for other reasons-if, for example, they thought the statute impermissibly discriminated among religions by singling out a practice (the Sabbath) important to some
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privilege to protection, the picture rapidly clears. Connecticut's
statute, unlike the Court's rule in Sherbert and Thomas, does
single out religious believers for a distinct accommodation. Many
people have "good cause" for taking particular days off; only religious believers are protected against dismissal. The Sherbert
Quartet is thus consistent with the Establishment Clause theory
successfully pursued by Caldor.74
The protection rationale can fully explain the unique results
in the Sherbert line of cases. It can also explain the robust use of
the compelling state interest test in those cases: when we explore
protection in more detail below, we will encounter good reason to
regard that test as apt to Sherbert and certain other religion
cases, but not well-suited to exemption cases in general. For the
moment, though, we are concerned only to demonstrate that one
can be sympathetic to the Court's general treatment of the unemployment benefits cases without embracing the privileging of
religion.
IV.

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY BELIEF AS A RATIONALE FOR

RELIGIous EXEMPTIONS
A. A New Approach: Equal Regard
We advocate a new approach to religious exemptions, founded on protection rather than privilege. Protection can explain and
justify the distinct status of religion in our constitutional tradition, offer a workable and attractive approach to religious exemptions, and-surprisingly-make some sense out of the patchwork
of precedent regarding religious exemptions.
History provides ample evidence that religious distinctions
inspire the worst sorts of political oppression. Post-Reformation
religious strife and the religious persecution from which many

religions but not others. The Thornton Court, however, did not treat the Connecticut
statute as an instance of discrimination among religions; it held the statute unconstitutional because it subordinated secular interests to religious interests. See id at 709 (The
State... commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular
interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of
the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.").
"' Of course, Caldor's Establishment Clause argument might fail for other reasons.
Like another famous Connecticut statute, the law in Thornton strikes us as "uncommonly
silly." Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart dissenting). It puts an
especially unfair burden upon small employers. Whether it also exceeds the legislature's
constitutional discretion to accommodate religious interests is less obvious. For preliminary reflections on related issues raised by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see
text accompanying notes 122-35.
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colonial settlers fled come immediately to our minds. But we
should not imagine that we need to look that far; within the
memory of many adults, anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism
were rampant in many parts of the United States. The sad history of religious intolerance and the unfortunate sociological truths
upon which it rests invite and demand the constitutional protection of minority religious beliefs.
In place of the mistaken claim that religion is uniquely valued by the Constitution, an approach based on protection depends upon the special vulnerability of minority religious beliefs
to hostility or indifference. Where privilege sponsored the principle of unimpaired flourishing, protection offers the principle of
equal regard. Equal regard requires simply that government treat
the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns
of citizens generally.
Equal regard needs to be on the active agenda of the judiciary because of the confluence of two circumstances. First, for many
religious believers, being able to conform their conduct to the
dictates of their beliefs is a matter of deep concern. Second, the
religious provenance of these strong behavioral impulses makes
them highly vulnerable to discrimination by official decision makers. Both of these propositions are widely acknowledged and do
not require detailed support here. But the second bears elaboration.
Religious commandments are not necessarily founded on or
limited by reasons accessible to nonbelievers; often they are understood to depend on flat or covenant and to implicate forces or
beings beyond human challenge or comprehension. Religion is
often the hub of tightly knit communities, whose habits, rituals,
and values are deeply alien to outsiders. At best, this is likely to
produce a chronic interfaith "tone deafness," in which the persons
of one faith do not easily empathize with the concerns of persons
in other faiths. At worst, it may produce hostility, even murderous hatred, among different religious groups.
The axis of antagonism-even with its broad range from
indifference to hostility-does not fully capture the subtle pattern
of religious vulnerability. From the perspective of some faiths, it
is desirable to convert nonbelievers rather than to injure them.
Such messianic faiths may have the welfare of the nonbelievers
genuinely and fully in mind as they zealously seek converts to
the true faith; they may even have the welfare of the nonbelievers fully in mind as they seek to shape the legal regime to dis-
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courage or prevent the nonbelievers from pursuing their own
beliefs. Even when conversion is not their aim, dominant faiths
(or clusters of faiths) that recognize the value and concerns of
others may nevertheless use political power to favor themselves.
For example, Christians might seek to benefit their faith by prescribing prayers in public schools or by shutting down businesses
on Sundays. Proponents might regard these partisan favors as
rewards for the virtuous or as inducements to nonbelievers-or
simply as nondiscriminatory benefits available to all wise enough
to recognize the propriety of the Christian way of life.
These nonantagonist variations may be "kinder, gentler"
forms of discrimination, but they remain stark failures of equal
regard. The possibility of nonantagonistic disregard of minority
concerns makes religious discrimination particularly subtle and
complex. This will be important to bear in mind as we turn to the
task of sketching a jurisprudence of equal regard.
B. The General Methodology of a Jurisprudence of Equal Regard
As we shall see, the complexity of religious discrimination
calls forth a somewhat complex jurisprudential project in the
name of equal regard. One conclusion, however, is easily drawn.
Wherever else it may lead, equal regard prohibits the state from
singling out the practices of minority religions for distinct and
disfavored treatment. Cases like Church of the Lukumi Babalu
75 are thus
Aye v City of Hialeah
easy under an equal regard regime. The Hialeah statute's obvious failure of the equal regard
test explains why the same Court that divided deeply in Smith
could readily find the Hialeah statute-which by its terms targeted the ritual slaughter of animals-unconstitutional. But the
transparency of the Hialeah case should not mislead us into
thinking that more opaque failures of equal regard are somehow
acceptable. When the state fails-whether through hate, habit, a
misguided impulse to lead others to the true way, or an indifference born of a lack of empathy-to treat the deep concerns of
minority believers with the same solicitude as those of mainstream citizens, the judiciary ought to intervene. The problem is
crafting a constitutional jurisprudence that is suited to this task.
Let us consider the general pattern of claims for religious
exemptions where the law is not overtly or facially hostile to a

'5 113 S Ct 2217 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a statute forbidding ritual animal
sacrifice that amounted to suppression of Santeria practitioners' religious beliefs).
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particular religious faith. Such claims can arise in many circumstances, but two recurring prototypes are instructive. In the first,
the state has a law of general application in place, but has
carved out exemptions for those able to claim personal hardship
or some other particularized qualification. These special exemption statutes include laws that designate formal categories of
beneficiaries and others that invoke functional categories. An
example of a formal special exemption is a law prohibiting the
consumption of alcohol but permitting the sacramental ingestion
of wine; an example of a functional special exemption is the requirement of "good cause" in unemployment compensation regimes for persons who are unable to accept or continue in a particular job.
In the second prototype for constitutional claims, the challenged state law has no provision for exemptions. It is easy to
find examples of this flat rule type: the familiar peyote ban in
Smith is one.
Equal regard requires that the state treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally. In either a special exemption or a fiat rule case, the
equal regard exemption claimant must demonstrate (a) that a
general law significantly interferes with some actions motivated
by her deep religious commitment; and (b) that had her deep,
religiously inspired76 concerns been treated with the same regard as that enjoyed by the fundamental concerns of citizens
generally, she would have been exempted from the reach of the
general law. Proposition (b), in turn, can be supported by one of
two claims. Either (1) the state has failed to appreciate the gravity of her interest in complying with the commands of her faith; or
(2) the state has appreciated the gravity of her interest, but nevertheless has played favorites among different belief systems on
sectarian grounds. Each of these last charges requires some elaboration.
To appreciate the gravity of a religious believer's interest in
complying with the commands of her faith, the state must adopt
the perspective of the believer; it is not at liberty to judge that
interest. Equal regard bars the state from disparaging religious

"' Because equal regard does not depend upon the idea that religious interests are
constitutionally privileged, equal regard also protects secular claimants threatened by
religious discrimination. For discussion of the issues involved, see the problem of "Secular
Thomas" at text accompanying note 90.
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interests that seem unreasonable from a secular perspective. So,
for example, the state may not defend its refusal to accommodate
a religious interest in animal sacrifice by arguing that it is silly
or disgusting for people to take a deep interest in slaughtering
chickens.
This establishes a limited kind of deference to religious perspectives. The state is further obliged to defer to the perspective
of a religious believer with regard to the existence of an interest
of great weight within the life of a believer. The state is obliged
to treat these deep interests as equal in importance and dignity
to the deep religious or secular interests of other persons. The
state is not obliged, however, to accept a religious believer's judgment about the importance of her religious interests as compared
to the legitimate secular interests of the state. This distinction is
crucial to the idea of equal regard: outside religion, the deep interests of individuals figure into but do not override the secular
concerns of the state, as we saw with Vincent the artist, whose
artistic passions could not override environmental or drug laws.
Equal regard insists on parity for religious belief, not privilege. If
religious believers could enforce their priorities over the secular
concerns of the state, we would be back to unimpaired flourishing
in all of its unacceptable extremity.
The state's obligation to avoid sectarian favoritism among
the holders of different belief systems bars it from preferring the
deep interests of persons of one faith over those of another. The
state cannot act on the perception that one faith is true, ennobling, attractive, or somehow congenial, or that another faith is
false, debasing, repulsive, or somehow uncongenial. As with the
obligation of the state to appreciate the gravity of a religious
believer's interests, however, the obligation to avoid favoritism
does not prevent the state from acting on its secular interests. So
a decision, for example, to bar the importation of a particular
animal on the grounds that it is a notorious carrier of a dangerous disease, does not suffer from the vice of favoritism, even
though a particular faith regards the animal as sacred and an
important part of its religious ceremonies.
To this point, we have been describing the conceptual entailments of equal regard, entailments that address both special exemption and flat rule cases. We now need to explore more concrete, hands-on judicial approaches to religious exemption claims.
Here the difference between flat rule and special exemption cases
becomes important.
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We can begin with special exemption cases and the curious
status of Sherbert and its progeny. Equal regard offers a principled basis for a distinction the Court has long since backed into
but has not fully elaborated; namely, the distinction between flat
rule cases like Smith, and special exemption cases, at least finctional special exemption cases, like Sherbert.
State unemployment benefit regimes understandably require
that persons be available for work in order to qualify. Inevitably,
cases will arise in which putative beneficiaries are unable to
accept or continue in a particular job because of special circumstances. Our earlier example of a worker who develops a nasty
allergy to the material she must handle in her job is apt here. So
each state, we can imagine, must develop a mechanism for determining whether a disabling circumstance is weighty enough to
justify the worker's refusal to accept or continue in a job, yet
narrow enough to leave the applicant generally available for
work.77
Now, we know this about the facts in Sherbert and its progeny: the applicants in each of these cases (in three of the cases the
applicant observed the Saturday Sabbath, and in one the applicant took himself to be religiously barred from manufacturing
munitions) fit the general profile of persons who would be approved for benefits under administrative regimes of the sort we
have sketched. That is, they were generally available for work,
they had powerful reasons to decline particular jobs, and the
range of employment opportunities they had to decline was comparatively narrow. Under these circumstances-even without the
added fact in Sherbert that the state had made extraordinary
accommodation of Sunday observers-it seems perfectly appropriate to worry that ad hoc administrative refusals to treat such
religiously motivated applicants as entitled to unemployment
benefits represent a failure of equal regard. It also seems appropriate to protect against such failures by applying the compelling
state interest test.
The unemployment benefits cases are not unique in this
respect. Not terribly long ago, Jewish synagogues and Catholic
churches were often denied planning permission in Protestant
suburbs. We can well expect that Muslims, some orthodox Jewish
groups, and various other sects will encounter comparable difficulties in locating places of worship and schools. The processing

" If the latter condition is not satisfied, of course, the applicant may be eligible for
other welfare entitlements, but not unemployment benefits.
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of applications for special use permits and other comparable
interactions between municipalities and nonmainstream religious
groups may well lend themselves to the Sherbert approach.'v
In all the cases just discussed, the state has defined a functional exemption category: the exemption is available to claimants who meet certain requirements (in the unemployment cases,
persons generally available for work but unable to take a particular job for personal reasons; in the zoning cases, noncommercial
educational and civic institutions with a reason for wishing to
build in a residential neighborhood).79 In principle, the exemption embraces religious interests along with secular ones. Once
we know that a particular claimant fits the relevant profile but
has nevertheless been denied accommodation, we may appropriately insist that the state prove that it has honored the principle
of equal regard.
Matters are even simpler if a religious claimant demands the
benefit of a formal, rather than functional, exemption. At best,
the formal category would be a proxy for an unarticulated functional category. At worst, the category would reflect an objectionable discrimination like that rejected by the Santeria case.80 If,
for example, a state liquor control ordinance were to exempt the
sacramental use of liquor by some sects but not others, the Constitution would require generalizing the exemption.
Less easy to resolve are flat rule cases, of which Smith is a
good example. In Smith, Oregon's prohibition on the use of peyote was a flat ban, applicable to everyone; there was no exemption
procedure and hence no profile of circumstance that presumptively qualified for exemption. The question posed by equal regard is

78 Constitutional battles over zoning exemptions for churches wishing to build in resi-

dential areas have been a rich source of state court litigation. In New York, for example,
numerous decisions have protected churches by invalidating zoning decisions adverse to
them. See, for example, Diocese of Rochester v PlanningBoard, 1 NY2d 508, 154 NYS2d
849 (1956) (invalidating a local refusal to grant a special permit for construction of a
church in a residential neighborhood); Westchester Reform Temple v Brown, 22 NY 488,
293 NYS2d 297 (1968) (invalidating local land-use decision restricting use of church
property); First Westminster PresbyterianChurch v City Council, 57 A2d 556, 393 NYS2d
180 (Sup Ct App Div 1977) (same). We are indebted to William E. Nelson's important ongoing study of New York state law in the twentieth century, which first alerted us to this
line of cases.
"' Zoning ordinances will, of course, vary with locale. For a discussion of the relevant
issues, see Robert M. Anderson, 3 American Law of Zoning § 19.28 at 367 (Law Co-op, 3d
ed 1986) (discussing the role of "special exceptions" in land use planning).
' See text accompanying note 75. See also Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 244 (1982)
("The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another.").
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whether the state's refusal to accommodate the sacramental
needs of the Native American Church represented 8 a failure to
take the deep interests of the members of the church as seriously
as well-recognized secular interests or the interests of adherents
to mainstream religions. The question can be posed
counterfactually: if strong secular needs (medical uses, for example) or mainstream religious needs had required exception to the
peyote ban, would Oregon have made such exceptions?82
The compelling state interest test, especially in the demanding form it takes elsewhere in constitutional law, is poorly suited
to the job of answering this question. To be sure, the test in its
normal form can function as an effective filter for failures of
equal regard; by insisting that the state grant religious exemptions except when doing so would compromise interests of "the
highest order," we require the state to weigh religious interests
very highly. But our earlier observations about the unworkability
of the equal-flourishing approach suggest that serious application
of the compelling state interest test would be far too fine a filter,
one which distorts civil order in unrecognizable and normatively
unattractive ways."
A more satisfying judicial implementation of equal regard
depends upon making local comparisons designed to measure the
"' We use the past tense because the Oregon legislature ultimately responded to the
events surrounding the Smith litigation by revising state law to permit the sacramental
ingestion of peyote. See Or Rev Stat § 475.992(5) (1993).
'2 The counterfactual question asks about mainstream religions, not majority religions. We may assume that majorities would always legislate in ways consistent with
their own interests, religious or not. Often, no question about exemptions for majority
religions will arise, since the majority will not enact any general rule inconsistent with its
own interests-though that is not necessarily the case, of course. Christian majorities, for
example, may wish to prohibit the consumption of alcohol in any quantity and then
exempt sacramental wine from the scope of their ban.
The counterfactual we propose assumes that the exemption question remains alive.
We assume the existence of a majority willing to bind itself by the general rule, and then
ask what exceptions the majority will make in favor of individuals with different interests. The point of the counterfactual is to rid the example of the distorting effects of
prejudice and indifference, not to suggest that minority religions should get the distributive benefits that flow from majoritarian political power.
' McConnell takes a contrary view. See McConnell, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1135-36 (cited
in note 16) (arguing that the compelling state interest test is the only way to determine
whether disparate schemes of accommodation are discriminatory). The instrumentalneutrality argument adopted by McConnell in the passage just cited seems to us different
from the arguments he invokes elsewhere when he argues not simply that government
must accommodate religions evenhandedly, but that government must accommodate
religions to the maximum extent possible. See, for example, note 31 (discussing another
argument McConnell makes on behalf of the compelling state interest test). We reject
both of McConnell's strategies, but for different reasons.
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degree of accommodation implicit in the statutory scheme as a
whole. Justice Stevens's analysis in Bowen v Roy' exemplifies
this strategy. Roy argued that she would violate religious convictions if she wrote her social security number on an application
for welfare benefits. She sought an exemption from the rule requiring her to submit the number. In his concurring opinion,
Stevens called attention to exemptions that benefitted those who,
because of physical disabilities or language barriers, could not
themselves fill out the applications.8 5 Stevens concluded that the
Constitution compelled the government to accommodate religious
barriers along with secular ones.8 6 In our terminology, we would
say that Stevens found that the incomplete set of exemptions
represented a failure of equal regard.
Smith and like cases will require exactly this sort of a caseby-case approach, in which evidence of the failure of equal regard
is laid on the table and evaluated. In Smith itself, the evidence
was cloudy at best. Oregon, like many states, made exceptions to
its alcohol laws for the sacramental use of wine, but the social
implications of sacramental wine and sacramental peyote may be
very different. Nine other states and the federal government
have made exceptions for the sacramental use of peyote, however,
and we are a sufficiently national culture to see in this fact some
evidence that such an exception would be reasonable in Oregon
as well. That reasonability, coupled with the latitude mainstream
religions enjoy to consummate their sacraments, argues for finding a failure of equal regard. Smith, we believe, could have plausibly come out either way on a case-by-case equal regard inquiry.
One approach that may seem promising would be to divide
cases similar to Smith between those where the religiously motivated conduct for which exemption is sought plainly injures third
parties, and those where the threatened harm is only to the believer herself. But there are two reasons to avoid such an approach. First, few if any of the collisions between legislative judgment and religious commandment are truly free of impact on
third parties. In Yoder, Amish parents were structuring a regime
of education not for themselves, but for children who had little or
no say in the matter. In Smith, the Christian Science treatmentrefusal cases, or the fundamentalist rattlesnake-handling and
cyanide-drinking cases, the possible burdens of addiction, inca476 US at 716-23 (Stevens concurring).
85

Id at 721.

8 Id at 721-22.
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pacity, or death may be cast not merely on the individual but
also on her dependents and the state itself. Second, if we think
that religious believers are entitled to make for themselves the
hard choices at the margin of state authority in accord with their
religious beliefs, we ought to believe that persons with deep personal commitments of a nonreligious nature enjoy the same license. Otherwise, we are committing the constitutional mistake
of sectarianism or partisanship.
C. Equal Regard and the Special Case of Secular Claimants
A special case that fits imperfectly with our analysis thus far
is that of secular claims of conscience. To address that case, we
need to pause a moment to give content to two very difficult
terms. For our purposes, a person is in the grip of conscience
when an ethical tug toward doing the right thing becomes a central, dominating feature of her motivation and self-identity."
And, for our purposes, the line between secular and religious conscience is roughly this: religious conscience is crucially dependent
on schemes of fact and value (epistemologies) that are private in
the sense that they do not depend upon their conformity to generally accepted tests of truth or widely shared perceptions of
value; secular conscience, in contrast, appeals to a public
epistemology that depends on generally accepted tests of truth
and widely shared perceptions of value.
Equal regard, of course, is a symmetrical principle, and applies to secular as well as sectarian concerns. But it does not
follow that the enforcement of equal regard as it applies to secular conscience is appropriately on the agenda of the judiciary.
After all, in principle, Vincent the artist is entitled to have his
deep, artistically inspired concerns treated by the state with the
same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally; but it does not follow that his entitlement should be
judicially enforced as an element of constitutional doctrine. As a
judicially enforced constitutional principle, equal regard must be
justified by vulnerability to discrimination.
Although our focus thus far has been on the vulnerability of
minority religious faiths to discrimination, secular beliefs that
take the form of deep commitments of conscience are also distinctly vulnerable to discrimination. Our society is sufficiently
religious to make the irreligious themselves targets of discrim-

'

See Section III.C.3.
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ination, either by those offended by atheism' or by those who
sympathize only with religious claims of conscience. Understandably, it is easier for some to associate a passionate conscientious
commitment that is markedly out of step with general sentiments
in the society-as a claim for exemption from an otherwise valid
law would entail-with an eccentric religious command than with
a moral claim purporting to apply to all right-thinking persons.
The conscientious-objection cases from the Vietnam War era
illustrate this sort of discrimination: Congress legislated an exemption that, until modified by the Supreme Court's therapeutic
construction, accommodated religious pacifists but not secular
ones.89

There is an additional reason for including the enforcement
of equal regard toward secular commitments of conscience within
the domain of judicial responsibility. Once we have placed the
protection of religious conscience within that domain, the constitutional demand that diverse belief systems be treated evenhandedly makes it inappropriate for the judiciary to parse among
claimants on the basis of their metaphysics. Imagine two versions of Thomas. The first involves Thomas himself, a Jehovah's
Witness whose religious scruples make it impossible for him to
manufacture tank turrets. The second involves "Secular Thomas,"
a pacifist who is in all respects identical to the real Thomas,
except that his pacifism is secular in character. A constitutional
jurisprudence that permitted intervention on behalf of one Thomas but not the other would be unacceptable.
While the judicial protection of conscience appropriately
extends to secular as well as religious claimants, the picture
changes in one important respect with the move to secular claimants. The protection of religious conscience requires that the
state treat religious belief as a "black box"; for purposes of assessing the impact of a sincerely held scheme of religious belief upon
the believer, the ultimate truth or the reasonability of the scheme
is beyond the constitutional competence of the state. This is implicit in the requirement of equal regard that the state defer to
the perspective of a religious believer as to the existence of an
interest of great weight within her life; it is a function of the
epistemically distinct, closed logic of religious belief.

" Not all conscientious secular claimants will be agnostic or atheistic, of course. One
could believe deeply in a given faith (including quite conventional faiths), yet found one's
deep commitment to pacificism on nonreligious grounds.
9 See text accompanying notes 91-98.
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With secular claims of conscience, however, the believer and
the state in principle share a common epistemic foundation. For
that reason, the state may legitimately reflect upon and respond
to the reasonability of the secular claimant's conscientious commitments. Reasonability here speaks not so much to the
plausibility of a given belief, as to the elevation of that belief to a
dominant position with regard to motivation and self-identity.
The importance of this becomes clear if we consider two
hypothetical cases that might arise under Indiana's unemployment compensation scheme. The first case involves "Secular
Thomas," whom we met three paragraphs back. The second case
involves claimants who are members of a union. After being laid
off work at a factory, both Secular Thomas and the union members are offered jobs as replacement workers when their former
colleagues go on strike. The union workers refuse the jobs because they believe, on secular grounds, that it would be immoral
to cross the picket lines established by their friends.' Secular
Thomas refuses the job due to his conscientious objection to the
production of armaments. Indiana review officers determine that
"Secular Thomas" and the union sympathizers refused work
without good cause. Can these claimants invoke the theory proposed here to challenge Indiana's decision?
"Secular Thomas" has the stronger case. Even those who
justify military action usually do so only in the face of great anguish and regret. The idea of a just war involves high moral
stakes and many imponderables. We may accordingly think it
reasonable for "Secular Thomas" to build his moral life around
absolute pacifist principles, even if we disagree with those principles and even if by doing so Thomas renders himself incapable
of complying with certain public norms (such as those that support the defense industry). Labor law issues have, by contrast, a
more economic focus and a less immediate connection to matters
of life and death. The stakes are lower and the imponderables
less profound. It is possible, but not likely, that we would deem
union sympathy to be reasonably constitutive of moral identity in
the same way that pacifism is.
This does not mean that the union workers are unreasonable
to believe that they should decline to serve as strikebreakers.
We, as judges or commentators, might even agree with their
judgment on that score. Equal regard, however, does not guaran' The facts of this hypothetical are drawn from Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co. v Review
Board, 146 Ind App 171, 253 NE2d 274 (2d Div 1969).
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tee that citizens will be able to honor their moral, social, or political commitments without politically imposed costs (only the
fantastical principle of unimpaired flourishing does that). Consider what the union workers are asking in the name of the Constitution: they are asking that the state be obliged to treat their
interest in union solidarity with the same gravity as it would
treat the interest, say, of a person who had a serious medical
allergy to the alloy they were being asked to work with. In the
general run of unemployment claimants, the Indiana review
officers are required to make judgments about what constitutes
"good cause." When they do so, they are necessarily making judgments about the gravity of a given interest within the life of a
reasonable person within their polity.
From this perspective, the question is not whether the union
workers are right about their moral obligations. The question is
instead the character of the injury that reasonable workers
strongly committed to union solidarity would suffer if they were
to defer to society's contrary assessment of those obligations. If
the state were to conclude that the quality of this injury does not
rise to that of a serious medical allergy, it is not clear that a
court should overturn that judgment.
The conscientious-objection cases from the Vietnam War
furnish a second set of examples. Congress enacted a statute that
provided an exemption for those "who by reason of their religious
training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form."9' The statute defined "religious training and
belief" to mean "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."92 In United States v Seeger, the Court concluded that the exemption encompassed any "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God
of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption. . . ."" Some
years later, in Welsh v United States,9 4 a four-Justice plurality
clarified Seeger's interpretation of the statute and stressed its
application to avowedly secular belief systems.

',

See United States v Seeger, 380 US 163, 164-65 (1965).

Id at 165, quoting the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 USC app §
456(j) (1958).
93

380 US at 176.

'

398 US 333 (1970).
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If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from
participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly
occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel to that
filled by... God" in traditionally religious persons.95
Later, in Gillette v United States and Negre v Larsen, decided
together in one opinion, the Court rejected constitutional claims
made by people who had moral objections not to "war in any
form" but to the specific war in Vietnam." Gillette involved a
secular objection; Negre a religious one.97
Applying equal regard to secular claims of conscience supports the idea that the result in Seeger was constitutionally compelled, but also provides a possible basis for distinguishing between Gillette and Negre. As we have already noticed in connection with "Secular Thomas," secular convictions about pacifism
may well affect self-definition in a way analogous to religious
convictions. Different judgments come into play, however, for
those who reject absolute versions of pacifism. Once the possibility of a just war is admitted, one must judge a specific war on
grounds that are partly empirical. Moreover, one must recognize
the government's responsibility to assess the legitimacy of particular wars. In the case of a secular objector, the moral calculus
facing the state is, at an epistemic level, the same as the
objector's own. In light of that parallel, we might think it unreasonable for secular objectors to build moral identities around
distinctions that they themselves recognize as matters inviting
political resolution. This argument carries less weight with re-

" Id at 340. Seeger and Welsh rest upon a rather audacious construction of legislative
history. When Congress legislated in 1948, it did so in the shadow of two circuit court cases that adopted conflicting interpretations of an existing exemption favoring religious objectors. Compare United States v Kauten, 133 F2d 703, 708 (2d Cir 1943) (the exemption
encompasses all conscientious objections), with Berman v United States, 156 F2d 377, 38081 (9th Cir 1946) (rejecting the Second Circuit rule and holding that only theists were
entitled to the exemption). The Senate Report on the 1948 Act-which came before the
Court in Seeger and Welsh-cited Berman with approval. S Rep No 1268, 80th Cong, 2d
Sess 14 (1948). See Welsh, 398 US at 348-50 (Harlan concurring) (discussing the circuit
court decisions and the background against which the legislation was passed). Justice
Harlan, who signed onto the Seeger opinion, expressly recanted that statutory construction in Welsh. Id at 344 (Harlan concurring). He nevertheless provided the decisive vote
for broadening the exemption to embrace secular claimants, but he did so on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. Id at 344-67.
96 401 US 437 (1971).

Id at 439-41.
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spect to religious objectors, since the state may no more pass
upon the reasonableness of religious distinctions among just and
unjust wars than it may pass upon the reasonableness of religious beliefs about wearing yarmulkes or eating beef on Friday.
Those who accept this line of reasoning might endorse Gillette
while rejecting Negre.5 Of course, this result is not a foregone
conclusion: we might ultimately decide instead that it is entirely
reasonable for secular individuals to build moral identities
around selective antiwar commitments. That is especially so if
the secular objector's selection principles put relatively little
weight on empirical issues (for example, if the objector thinks
that wars are just only if fought to prohibit genocide or slavery).
But such secular claims, unlike their religious counterparts,
demand that we make a judgment about the reasonableness of
the claimant's moral commitments before we assess the state's
justification for discrepant treatment.
The openness of claims of secular conscience to a public standard of reasonableness is an important gloss on our earlier observations about Seeger and Secular Thomas. Seeger clearly was
correctly decided, and it would indeed be inappropriate for a
court to protect the real Thomas and not Secular Thomas. But
these observations cannot be generalized to the full run of conscientious secular claimants; they are specific to the (presumably

In some cases, the predicament of the secular and religious objector will be constitutionally indistinguishable. The religious believer might derive from her faith a rather
general proposition about just and unjust wars: thinking, for example, that the only just
wars are those fought to vindicate humanitarian principles rather than economic interests. The problem of applying this principle might be no different for the religious believer
than for the secular philosopher who subscribes to the same principle upon different
grounds. If that were the whole story, equal regard would then demand like treatment for
the religious and philosophic objectors. This conclusion seems to have special force in the
case of Negre, who apparently derived from theology only a general obligation "to discriminate between 'just' and 'unjust' wars." Id at 441.
However, religious belief may determine not only the content of a believer's moral
commitments, but also the centrality of those moral commitments in a believer's life. Put
another way, the reasonableness of building a moral life around a particular commitment
may itself vary with religious perspective even if the commitment itself does not. Negre
may have implicated this problem, for Negre himself was "firmly of the view that any
personal involvement in that war would contravene his conscience and 'all that [he] had
been taught in [his] religious training.'" Id. Society need not defer to such judgments
when deciding how to balance social need against individual interests-that is, society
need not agree with Negre that individuals should be free to choose for themselves
whether to participate in wars. Nevertheless, when determining the gravity of the individual injuries that would occur if an exemption were denied, society must respect the
religious individual's own sincerely held views about the centrality of particular practices
to that individual's (religiously constituted) moral identity. That requirement is what
distinguishes Gillette from Negre.
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substantial) subset of claimants whose conscientious commitments are reasonable.
D. Equal Regard and Equal Protection
As we flesh out the idea of equal regard, it may seem to
resemble a robust jurisprudence of equal protection. Robust in
this sense: contemporary equal protection doctrine protects African Americans and women by barring both facial distinctions
disfavoring those groups and facially neutral governmental action
that is motivated by animus toward those groups; it does not bar
facially neutral governmental action that has only a disparate
impact on protected groups. 9 Equal regard seems more demanding in this respect than equal protection, and our readers may
wonder whether we mean to argue that religion should enjoy
special protection, that the Supreme Court has erred in excluding
disparate impact from close constitutional scrutiny in equal protection cases, or some third proposition not yet on the table.
Certainly equal regard and equal protection have much in
common-not only because both invoke the general norm of
equality, but also because, as we observed earlier, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence of racial equality is the most prominent
example of the paradigm of protection in constitutional law.
Moreover, as we shall see in a moment, one of our specific recommendations may well have implications outside the context of
religious liberty. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conflate
equal regard with traditional equal protection doctrine in general
or with a new sensitivity to disparate impact in particular.
Extant equal protection jurisprudence assumes that governmental behavior operating to disadvantage a vulnerable group is
either purposefully designed to accomplish that result or is innocent of any constitutionally cognizable harm. Equal regard, of
course, condemns governmental behavior that purposefully
harms a religious group; but it also identifies and condemns
behavior that lies in a middle ground between purposeful discrimination and unintended disparate harm. Governmental action that betrays a failure to treat the serious concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard extended to the deep

See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976) (judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination). See also PersonnelAdministrator
of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256 (1979) (discriminatory intent exists only when actions were taken because of, not merely in spite of, their adverse effects upon an identifiable group).
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concerns of citizens generally is vulnerable to a distinct constitutional objection.
Consider again the facts of Thomas. The Indiana board, we
may imagine, issues its negative ruling against Thomas in broad
terms; they make plain that religious pacifists who decline or
leave employment in the manufacture of munitions will be held
to lack "good cause," and hence will forfeit their eligibility for
unemployment compensation. Of course, this rule has a disparate
impact on persons whose religious consciences condemn participation in the production of armaments, as compared with most
workers in Indiana who are not disabled by religious scruples of
this sort. But that circumstance, standing alone, does not constitute a failure of equal regard. The failure lies in the fact that
Indiana recognizes other deep personal interests, like physical
allergies, as "good cause" for declining or leaving employment.
This is substantive discrimination, distinct from mere incidental
harm, and constitutionally condemnable. The problem is not that
Indiana's eligibility criteria disadvantage minority religions. The
problem is that Indiana's policy is partial in the way that it defines personal interests: the state has failed to recognize a set of
interests distinct to a minority religious position. This constitutional complaint, however, is not dependent upon a finding that
the Indiana board disapproved of religious pacifism, or took satisfaction from the discomfort of religious pacifists-hence the middle ground.
The protection of religious minorities focuses on this middle
ground for good reason. Religion does more than define the terms
on which believers may satisfy their interests; it actually constitutes their interests. There is a substantial risk that governmental actors, even while bearing no animus toward minority religious believers, will ignore, undervalue, or implicitly denigrate
their deep, religiously motivated concerns."0 This tendency
stems from the sociological features of religion, features that we
have already canvassed and that are familiar to historical and
contemporary experience: the deep concerns of religious believers
can differ sharply from each other and from widely shared secular concerns; systems of religious belief can rest on radically
distinct epistemologies and be inaccessible to the reason and
intuitions of nonbelievers; and religious believers may be tempted

10

Compare Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland

Revisited, 1989 S Ct Rev 373, 398 (discussing the inability of Christian Justices to project
themselves into the understandings of "reasonable" non-Christians).
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to celebrate or reward their own faith, even while filled with
loving concern for the souls of nonbelievers. As a result, the interests of religious believers may be invisible, or may appear as
mere tastes or even as delusions, from the standpoint of outside
observers.
The constitutional principle of equal regard bears a special
relationship to programs of discretionary accommodation. Such
programs, like the principle of equal regard itself, recognize and
respond to idiosyncratic interests within society. Governments
often choose to sacrifice general policy concerns to accommodate
the deep, constitutive interests of individuals. But these discretionary schemes of accommodation may trigger the requirements
of equal regard and so generate additional, constitutionally compelled exemptions.
Of course, while discretionary exemptions serve important
individual interests, they also may impose substantial social
costs. Accordingly, they are grudging and exceptional events
rather than familiar and systematic ones. Embodied in legislation, these accommodations often take the form of an unexamined patchwork. Oregon's controlled substance laws, which exempted the ritual use of alcohol but not the ritual use of peyote,
illustrate the disparities that arise. Delegating the project of accommodation to an administrative agency invites ad hoc decisions; here, Thomas is once again exemplary. This discretionary
terrain is fertile ground for the undervaluation of minority religious interests.
This confluence of religious insularity, deep personal interest,
and governmental discretion is what justifies and requires constitutional sensitivity to the middle ground of equal regard. We do
not mean to insist, however, that the case for equal regard is
innocent of implications for the reform of equal protection doctrine. To the contrary, in at least one respect our analysis leads
to the identification of shortcomings in that doctrine, and there
may be others.
We have suggested that the compelling state interest test
may have a legitimate role to play with regard to administrative
processes of the sort involved in Thomas. In that setting, the test
guards against the possibility that ad hoc administrative decisions will traduce the principle of equal regard by denying benefits to religiously motivated persons who are otherwise qualified.
Indeed, in a sense, cases like Thomas do not involve a claim for
an exemption at all; on the contrary, Thomas and other claimants demand the fair application of a general standard-such as
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"good cause"--that they believe already fits their own circumstances. In terms of the typology we developed earlier, Thomas
presents a challenge to an exemption defined functionally, not
formally. Where minority religious claimants satisfy the general
envelope of circumstance contemplated by an administrative
regime of exemption-here, by being generally available for work
and having a narrow but sharp personal interest in declining
particular employment-the compelling state interest test seems
well-suited to insuring that the process takes fair account of their
interests.
The administration of "good cause" exemptions in unemployment compensation regimes is a ready example of how our analysis of equal regard can inform equal protection analysis outside
the domain of religious claimants. Given the unique concerns of
pregnant women and the social practices that usually render
women responsible for child care, women have job selection interests not shared by men; and it is entirely possible that state
administrators' unemployment decisions will chronically undervalue the weight or sincerity of these interests.'' That being
so, it may well be the case that constitutional justice would best
be served by heightened judicial scrutiny of adverse "good cause"
determinations implicating pregnancy and child care. But in
Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Corp.,"02 the Supreme Court applied Washington v Davis to an administrative
zoning process, holding that no claim of unconstitutional race
discrimination could succeed absent evidence of discriminatory
intent. The Court made clear that disparate impact alone would
almost never constitute sufficient grounds for inferring discriminatory intent.0 3 Presumably, the Court would apply these prin-

101

At least prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas, a disproportionate

number of the Indiana unemployment benefits cases rejecting colorable claims of "good
cause involved working mothers who quit their jobs after changes in schedule, location,
or home life created logistical difficulties. See, for example, Gray v Dobbs House, Inc., 171
Ind App 444, 357 NE2d 900 (2d Dist 1976) (shift change created child care problem);
Ingress-Plastene, Inc. v Review Board, 143 Ind App 95, 238 NE2d 490 (2d Dist 1968)
(same); Wicker v Review Board, 173 Ind App 657, 365 NE2d 787 (2d Dist 1977) (female
employee faced with new transportation costs); Tobin v Review Board, 157 Ind App 610,
301 NE2d 404 (3d Dist 1973) (transportation problem getting to new plant); Nordhoff v
Review Board, 130 Ind App 172, 162 NE2d 717 (2d Div 1959) (new mother left job due to
long commute). Prior to 1971, the Indiana statute explicitly stated that parental obligations could never constitute good cause for quitting a job. Gray, 357 NE2d at 906. See also
the harassment cases mentioned in note 64, both of which involved female claimants.
102 429 US 252, 264-68 (1977).
10 Id at 266 ("Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion [v Lightfoot, 364 US 339
(1960)] or Yick Wo [v Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886)], impact alone is not determinative, and
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ciples even more resolutely to the claims of women regarding
4
pregnancy and child care."
Our argument implies that, in at least this limited respect,
Arlington Heights is inconsistent with Thomas. Further, there
may be other administrative settings where the distinct interests
of racial minorities are at hazard to a failure of equal regard. To
the extent that Arlington Heights forecloses the application of the
10 5
middle-ground jurisprudence of equal regard in such cases,
we believe that it is in error. Outside these specialized administrative settings, however, the controversial rule of Washington v
Davis stands or falls upon considerations independent of those
discussed here.' 6
E. Congress to the Rescue?
1. Legislative help in securing equal regard.
The principle of unimpaired flourishing, as we have seen,
describes an unobtainable and undesirable world, and offers
neither conceptual nor practical guidance for making the compromises necessary to reach an appropriate degree of accommodation
for religious interests. Equal regard is very different. It is normatively attractive, conceptually precise, and describes a liveable
world: a world that accommodates the deep, religiously inspired
concerns of minority religious believers to the same degree as the
deep concerns of citizens generally.
But equal regard is very demanding in the kind of judgment
it requires; so demanding that it is unrealistic to expect the constitutional judiciary to effectively police the requirement in all
cases. There will, of course, be easy cases, like Lukumi Babalu
Aye,'0 7 where governmental behavior reeked of overt hostility to
the beliefs and practices of the Santeria faithful. But overt hostility to religious minorities is not necessary to finding a failure of
equal regard. Ultimately, equal regard constrains outcomes, not

the Court must look to other evidence.").
...Not only has the Court applied the Davis rule to gender discrimination, see Feeney,
442 US at 273-74, but the Court has also ruled that discrimination related to pregnancy is
not gender discrimination at all. Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484, 496-97 n 20 (1974).
106 Although the Arlington Heights Court did not explicitly address arguments that
would counsel against applying Davis to administrative settings, its holding implicitly
rejects any such limits on the discriminatory intent requirement.
1"6 For a different view, see Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 Harv L Rev 118, 128-30 (1993) (arguing that Smith and Davis are wrong for
the same reason).
'07 113 S Ct 2217 (1993).

1302

The University of Chicago Law Review

[61:1245

processes. It is no defense if legislators give lip service to notions
of religious equality, or hold extensive hearings about the interests of religious interests, or make warm, sympathetic statements about minority religions and the First Amendment; neither the trappings of good intention nor even good intentions
themselves suffice. Equal regard tests the balance of concern; it
demands that the government accord the religious interests of
minority believers the regard they give other deep concerns, religious and secular.
In some cases, where local comparisons are available, equal
regard will invite a tractable judicial inquiry. The invidious distinction between Sunday observers and Saturday observers in
Sherbert is blatant because the affected interests resemble one
another so closely. As comparisons grow more remote, the confidence and competence of the judiciary will begin to falter.
Thomas is harder than Sherbert because the comparison requires
judgments spanning a greater variety of factors than were involved in Sherbert. Likewise, it is possible, though certainly not
easy, for judges in Smith to estimate the relative weight of
Oregon's interest in preventing the abuse of peyote by comparison to Oregon's interest in preventing the abuse of alcohol. It
would be considerably more difficult to compare the absence of a
peyote exemption to exemptions pertaining to still more remote
topics, such as, for example, a statutory provision exempting
religiously operated day-care centers from a state's licensing
scheme.' 8 The state interests involved are clearly different;
saying which is weightier turns upon a rather stark policy judgment not readily made by judges. Somewhere along the line, the
capacity of the judiciary to police equal regard will run out.
These limits, however, are related to institutional competence, not to the substance of equal regard itself. Remote discrimination may be more difficult to identify, but certainly is no more
permissible, than local discrimination. For that reason, the rights
that flow from equal regard are likely to be underenforced by the
judiciary: the judicial regime we recommend will vindicate equal
regard incompletely, and therefore legislative attention will be
indispensable to full satisfaction of the principle.
Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n"°9 illustrates the institutional issues. Lyng arose because the govern-

10 See, for example, Ind Code Ann § 12-17.4-2-7 (West 1994) (exempting church-run

facilities from child care regulations).
"9 485 US 439 (1988).
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ment owned land deemed sacred by a Native American religion.
The Bureau of Land Management had decided to build a road
through the land. Members of the religion sued, claiming that the
road would desecrate the site and radically impair their ability to
exercise their religion. The Supreme Court denied the claim."'
How would it fare under the regime proposed here?
Local comparisons are unlikely to yield grounds sufficient to
bar the government from building its road. The common law presumed that parcels of property were largely incomparable."'
One need not go that far in order to recognize that geographic
differences will vastly alter the nature and weight of government
interests in developing property that it owns."' Moreover, it is
entirely possible that the key circumstance in Lyng-namely,
government ownership of a sacred site-will rarely if ever recur.
The comparative enterprise sponsored by equal regard may accordingly find no purchase in Lyng.
The facts of Lyng, however, are genuinely extreme. The
government's choice of location for the road was going to cripple,
if not destroy, an entire religious group's ability to practice their
faith."' Facts this extreme may facilitate counterfactual speculation by the judiciary about whether it was imaginable that the
agency would have inflicted a comparable harm on, say, a more
familiar Christian sect for no better reason than the convenience
of this particular location of their road." 4 The facts in Lyng
could have sustained such an inquiry, and one might reasonably
think the case wrongly decided on that ground.
But many cases may be like Lyng in that they offer no plausible basis for direct comparison of regard, while differing from
Lyng in that they are not so extreme as to offer the possibility of
a confident counterfactual speculation. This does not mean that
the challenged governmental decisions refusing to accommodate
religious interests reflect the evenhandedness demanded by equal

-1o Id at 458.

. See, for example, E. Allan Farnsworth, 3 Farnsworthon Contracts § 12.6 at 172
(Little, Brown, 1990) (discussing the uniqueness presumption as grounds for favoring
specific performance as a remedy for breach of real estate contracts).
112

See Lyng, 485 US at 443.
Id at 442.

1.4 Compare id at 454 ("Except for abandoning its project entirely, and thereby leaving
two existing segments of road to dead-end in the middle of a National Forest, it is difficult
to see how the Government could have been more solicitous."), with id at 463-64 (Brennan
dissenting) (summarizing district court findings to the effect that the proposed road
served little purpose that could not be accomplished equally as well by construction at
alternative locations).
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regard; it merely means that the limits of the judiciary's role to
enforce equal regard has been reached. But to say that such
failures of equal regard will go uncorrected by the judiciary is not
to say that the failure should, or even that it will, go uncorrected.
Lyng itself proves the point: in the end the political process responded to interests the judiciary had not protected, and the
Bureau of Land Management relocated the road."5
In this respect, Lyng is anything but rare. When the Supreme Court refused to excuse Mennonite petitioners from participating in the social security system, Congress accommodated
churches that had religious objections to participating in the
social security system." 6 When the Supreme Court refused to
invalidate military regulations that prohibited the wearing of a
yarmulke, Congress granted relief."7 And when the Supreme
Court refused to exempt Native American believers from
Oregon's state law prohibiting consumption of peyote, Oregon
legislated an exemption to its law." 8 Add to this line of decisions the Supreme Court's remarkable approval of Sunday closing laws"' and it begins to appear that the political branches
have protected religious liberty more vigorously than has the
Court.
There are several reasons why legislatures may be better at
both the general task of accommodating religious interests and
the more specific task of vindicating the constitutional principle
of equal regard. With regard to accommodation in general, the
explanation for legislative primacy immediately emerges from
our analysis. Even if the demands of equal regard have been
fully satisfied, legislatures have discretion to enhance the value
they place upon accommodating fundamental personal commitments, including religious commitments. The legislature's decision favoring increased accommodation would not be a matter of
...See House Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1989, HR Rep No 713, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 72 (1988)
(withdrawing funding for the road).
11 Compare United States v Lee, 455 US 252 (1982) (denying relief), with 26 USC §
3121(w) (1984) (exempting from Social Security obligations those "churches and churchcontrolled organizations" that are "opposed for religious reasons to the payment of the tax
imposed under Section 311"). The relief granted by Congress would not, however, help Lee
himself, for he was not operating a "church-controlled organization."
"' Compare Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986) (denying relief), with 10 USC
§ 774 (1988) (granting it).
.. Compare Smith, 494 US 872 (denying relief), with Or Rev Stat § 475.992(5) (1993)
(granting it).
"' See Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599 (1961) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge);
McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420 (1961) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge).
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constitutional duty, although the principle of equal regard would
then require the legislature (and authorize the courts) to ensure
that the new premium upon accommodation is shared equally.
When it comes to applying equal regard, legislators again
have an advantage over judges. Judges must make local comparisons to test whether legislators have fairly weighed individual
interests against the interests of the public as a whole. Legislators, however, need not rely upon local comparisons. They may
judge the weight of government interests directly, and thereby
compare them even across widely disparate policies. Global comparisons depend upon difficult judgments about the importance of
various government interests, but such judgments are, after all,
integral to everyday legislative decision making.
It may seem odd to rely upon the political branches to bring
the enforcement of equal regard up to full measure. Isn't this an
especially bold case of inviting the fox to guard the chickens?
After all, the need for a judicially enforceable constitutional principle of equal regard stems from the fact that elected officials will
often violate it because of religious bias. And, indeed, we do believe that this concern about bias makes it impossible for the judiciary to abandon 'responsibility for exemption claims entirely,
as the Smith majority seemed willing to do.
The institutional dynamic is, however, complicated for two
reasons. First, political institutions do not speak with one voice.
Religious bias may be most likely to prevail in small policy-making bodies that work in poorly lit corners of the public square.
The individual claims officers involved in Thomas provide an
extreme example of discretion that is both relatively unarticulated and concentrated in a single individual. Less extreme versions
of the same problem may arise with respect to decision making
by bureaucracies, small towns, military commanders, and legislative committees. But as Madison pointed out in Federalist10, we
have reason to expect better from more cosmopolitan institutions,
especially Congress as a whole.12
Second, political institutions may react differently to an issue
once they see it as a matter of religious liberty. Some may, as
one would hope, take the time and care to research the impact of
legislation upon religious freedom. Legislators are, however,
always busy and sometimes sloppy. Constitutional issues are not
generally their chief preoccupation.1 2 ' They may accordingly
" Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 82-83
(Mentor, 1961).
121 Compare Sager, 65 NYU L Rev at 958 (cited in note 40) (Unlike the legislature, the
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pass legislation without recognizing the constitutional questions
it poses. Cases like Goldman, Lyng, and Smith thus serve an important "signalling" function by alerting legislative defenders of
religious liberty to an issue that may have escaped their attention. Litigation under the principle of equal regard would continue to serve that function, even if (as happened in Goldman, Lyng,
and Smith) the courts themselves refused relief.
2. The unhappy case of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993.
Legislative solicitude for religious liberty does not always aid
the constitutional cause, of course. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 is a glaring case in point. A sweeping repudiation of Smith, the Act instructs courts to grant individuals exemptions from laws that substantially burden their "exercise of
religion," except where "application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."'22 As evidence that the elected branches
may be counted upon to support religious liberty vigorously, the
Act is exemplary. As policy, however, the Act is certainly unwise
and perhaps unconstitutional. It is a clumsy and misguided response to the failings of Smith.
The compelling state interest test is suitable only where it is
appropriate to indulge in a broad and robust presumption of
unconstitutionality, where the great run of cases that present the
characteristic that triggers the test will be abhorrent to our best
understanding of appropriate governmental behavior. As we have
been at pains to demonstrate, religious exemption cases do not fit
that description. Conscientious governments, acting for sound,
unbiased reasons, will nevertheless promulgate general rules
that interfere with some religious beliefs; the prolixity and idiosyncracy of religious belief make such collisions inevitable. This
is openly conceded by all fair commentators, and no one seriously
advances the claim that secular government must routinely yield
to the full run of religious commandments. To mandate the compelling state interest test under these circumstances is to invite

judiciary introduces into the political process "an interval of review keyed exclusively... to questions of political justice.").
'2
Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, 1488-89, § 3 (1993), codified at 42 USCA §
2000bb-1.
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confusion, duplicity, and dilution. That is the unmistakable lesson of our experience with religious exemptions before Smith.
There is little indication that Congress gave the unhappy
pre-Smith experience serious thought. Indeed, it is unlikely that
Congress understood that the results in the Sherbert line and in
Yoder were the exception rather than the rule even before Smith,
that in the jurisprudence of religious accommodation the compelling state interest test has been "strict in theory but feeble in
fact," or that the pre-Smith accommodation jurisprudence as a
whole was laced with confusion and contradiction. This is doubly
unfortunate. It is doubtful that an informed Congress would have
cast the Act in such problematic terms. And now that Congress
has done so, it falls upon the judiciary to give meaning to a doctrinal formulation that failed for good reason once before. Should
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act be read to "restore" the
status quo ante, with all of its fluttering uncertainty? Should the
triggering condition of the statute-namely, the imposition of a
"burden" on "a person's exercise of religion"--be understood to
refer to the constitutional concept of Free Exercise (which could,
in turn, be understood to refer to a concern for equal regard rather than undiminished welfare), or some independent concept?
Should the statute's compelling state interest language be understood as invoking the pale pre-Smith use of that standard in
religion cases, as referring to more robust and stable applications
of the standard in other constitutional areas, or as inviting the
Court to make a fresh start in the religious accommodation area,
guided by the words of the 12standard
detached from any of the
3
their familiar environments?
In the course of sowing this confusion, the Act forfeits whatever benefits might accrue from special legislative competence.
Instead of evaluating specific claims for exemption, Congress
simply handed the problem back to the judiciary, inviting it to
continue on its erratic pre-Smith course. If Congress wished to
improve the federal government's sensitivity to religious interests, it could have done much better. Congress could, for example, have constituted a subcommittee with special responsibility
for identifying instances in which religious interests had been
"' For similar reflections, see, for example, Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct
Paradigm in the Supreme Court'sFree Exercise Jurisprudence:A Theological Account of
the Failureto ProtectReligious Conduct, 54 Ohio St L J 713, 753-54 n 240 (1993) (arguing
the plan of the Act is "plainly self-contradictory"); Note, 78 Va L Rev at 1439-40 (cited in
note 16) (claiming the Act "accomplish[es] little" and may hinder efforts to secure legislative accommodation).
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undervalued by state or federal actors designing general policies.
Congress might then have remedied these specific problems by
tailoring legislation to protect the religious interests at stake.
Such a process would have drawn upon congressional competence, diminished litigation costs, and avoided embroiling the
judiciary in the awkward way mandated by the Act.
Legislation is not unconstitutional simply because it is badly
drafted or misguided. In this instance, however, the Act's defects
raise serious constitutional questions. Congress seems to have
believed that those seeking exemptions for religiously motivated
conduct were constitutionally entitled to the benefits of the compelling state interest test, both in principle and as a matter of
pre-Smith precedent. This was the situation Congress sought to
"restore." But Congress was mistaken both about constitutional
principle and about the best understanding of pre-Smith decisions. The resulting divergence between the best constitutional
understanding and the pseudoconstitutional mandate of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act raises several problems.'24
First, the Act may be outside the scope of congressional power. Insofar as it affects state law, the Act purports to draw its authority from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most theories of Section 5 authority limit its scope to legislation that vindicates constitutional rights; on these accounts, Congress can go
further than the judiciary in protecting constitutional rights, but
only because the judiciary does not or cannot fully protect such
rights. Such limits, when combined with the constitutional argument of this essay, draw into question the Act's constitutionality:
equal regard does not generally entitle those claiming religious
exemptions to the presumptive force of the compelling state interest test, and hence Section 5 may not authorize Congress to impose the compelling state interest standard upon the states.
Second, in its attempt to re-inflate pre-Smith jurisprudence,
the Act may itself be unconstitutional under the equal regard
standard. Equal regard calls upon courts to guard against policies that disfavor fundamental secular commitments by comparison to religious interests. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
explicitly protects only those interests which are religious. If the
statute's reference to religion is interpreted restrictively and
exclusively, the resulting favoritism for religion is probably
unconstitutional.'2 5
12

Ira Lupu has expressed doubts similar to those raised by the two articles in note

123. See Lupu, 140 U Pa L Rev at 609-10 (1991) (cited in note 16).
1
Compare Thornton v Caldor, Inc., 472 US 703 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a
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The third constitutional problem of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is more subtle but perhaps more damning than
the other two. The Act deploys a conceptual vocabulary that is
abidingly constitutional. The Act begins by articulating findings
that criticize the Court's constitutional judgment in Smith.'
The articulated purpose of the Act is "to restore the compelling
state interest test as set forth in [Sherbert and Yoder] ....""'
The Act uses the language of constitutional doctrine to name the
delict that is its target: governmental behavior that "substantially burden[s] a person's exercise of religion . ".."128
And the
Act directs courts to measure exceptional claims for justification
of that delict against a constitutional standard, the compelling
state interest test.'2 9 The Act directs the Court to play a peculiar part in a constitutional drama: the Court must act as though
it had changed its mind about the constitutional status of religious exemptions, or as though it were obliged to accept
Congress's judgment about the meaning of the Constitution as
decisive.
Rather than simply legislating to protect religious interests,
Congress has represented its policy as a correction to the internal
logic of a doctrine for which the judiciary has principle responsibility. In effect, the Act seeks to compel the courts to adjudicate
apparently constitutional claims in a manner inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's own judgment about the Constitution. By
masking the character of Congress's action, the constitutional formulations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act diminish

Connecticut statute that required employers to permit religious employees to stay home
from work without fear of dismissal on their religiously determined day of rest).
" 42 USCA § 2000bb(a) reads:
Findings.-The Congress finds that(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests.
12 Id § 2000bb(b).
12 Id § 2000bb-l(a).
'2

Id § 2000bb-l(b).
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institutional accountability and detract from the educative impact of constitutional adjudication.3 °
As such, the Act may be an especially troubling example of
what the Court condemned in United States v Klein.'' In Klein,
the Court considered a congressional statute enabling Union
loyalists to recover property that had been seized from them
during the Civil War. In order to prohibit recovery by persons
whose claim to loyalty depended upon a presidential pardon,
Congress instructed the Court of Claims to dismiss such claims
for want of jurisdiction. The Klein Court found the antipardon
provision unconstitutional on two alternative grounds. First, the
provision infringed upon the presidential pardon power. Second,
the provision created a "rule of decision" in "cases pending before" the court; that is, "the court is forbidden to give the effect to
evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have,
and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary."3 2 It is
this second proposition that connects Klein to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Klein Court's argument is not easy to
decipher, but the Court seems to have been insisting that Congress cannot enlist the judiciary in a charade, requiring it to
apply a given statutory standard in a manner fundamentally
different than it thought proper.'33 Nowhere should we be more
sympathetic with this constitutional objection to legislative overreaching than when the charade implicates the content of important constitutional principles like religious liberty.3 4
The Act might survive each of these challenges. For example,
some theories of the Fourteenth Amendment construe Section 5
to authorize any legislation that expands the scope of individual
liberty. Or supporters of the Act might pin their hopes on the
almost limitless pliancy of the modern Commerce Clause. As for
the substantive challenge, perhaps the courts would be willing to
offer a therapeutic construction of the sort propounded in Seeger,
where imaginative interpretation allowed secular claimants to
share the benefits of a statute that, by its terms, applied only to
"3 On the Court's educative role, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 NYU L Rev 961 (1992) (analyzing that role).

3' 80 US 128 (1871).

Id at 146-48.
" See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 70-77,
87-88 (1981) (discussing Klein).
34 Another illustration of this principle is New York v United States, 112 S Ct 2408
(1992), where the Court held that Congress cannot mask national policy behind state policy by commanding the states to perform specific actions.
132
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those moved by "religious training and belief" and "belief in relation to a Supreme Being."" 5 Finally, defenders of the Act might
distinguish Klein by relying on a formal point: the provision challenged in Klein was an instruction addressed to courts, while the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act imposes substantive regulations on nonjudicial actors.
For the moment, we prefer to remain agnostic about these
issues. Much will inevitably turn upon judicial interpretation of
the Act. The ambiguities of the congressional "restoration" make
it possible that judges will construe the Act through the lens of
equal regard. That seems to us the best course. By pursuing it,
courts would not only avoid the constitutional difficulties identified above but also lend new coherence to a doctrine sorely in
need of principled reconstruction.
F. The Autonomy of Religious Organizations
Principles of protection can, we believe, supply a powerful
and attractive basis for constitutional rights exempting religiously motivated conduct from generally applicable laws. The vulnerability of religion, not its virtue or precedence, seems to us the
foundation for the Constitution's special solicitude for religious
activity. Yet, having journeyed so doggedly in one direction, it
now seems appropriate to tack in another. Protection and privilege are not mutually exclusive competitors. What we have said
at least twice before bears repeating: religious conduct will often
draw to its aid principles of privilege not limited to religion. If we
neglect that point, the limits upon equal regard will begin to
seem puzzling. We are now in a position, for example, to see how
privilege and protection provide overlapping forms of constitutional security for religious organizations.
We begin by summarizing and elaborating some points made
earlier. The idea that the government may not tell churches how
to choose their leaders or regulate their membership has secular
analogues: the government may not tell us whom we may invite
to our home, how we should choose our friends, or what rules
should govern conversation at the dinner table. Constitutional
theorists often treat this set of rights by reference to ideas about
privacy; our suggestion is that we should understand privacy in a
way that embraces the life of religious communities. This approach would fail if activities ceased to be private whenever they

'" See 380 US at 165-66.
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involved large numbers of people, took place outside the home, or
encompassed formal behavior. But such characteristics need not
control our understanding of the public/private distinction. Instead, we propose that some relationships project private behavior into public spaces. On this view, the public or private character of an association would depend in part upon its purposes.
Some goals-such as intimacy, shared understanding, self-expression, personal growth, and philosophical edification-tend to put
associations and conduct on the private side of the line. Other objectives-especially commercial prosperity and political power-provide grounds for regarding associations and conduct as
public. The differences among these various purposes make it
sensible (although not always easy) to distinguish among those
associations that constitute communities, and hence have a private aspect, and those which seem instead to be mere public
organizations.
That some large associations (religious or not) may have
essentially private aspects should come as no surprise to those
familiar with Supreme Court jurisprudence. In his opinion for
the Court in Roberts v United States Jaycees, Justice Brennan
suggested the existence of a 'broad range of human relationships" arrayed between two "poles": at the level of greatest privacy, "the selection of one's spouse," and at the level of least privacy, "the choice of one's fellow employees."" 6 According to
Brennan, diverse factors will play a role in placing a given relationship within this spectrum. He pointed in particular to "size,
purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent."" 7 While
Brennan's interpretation allows for the possibility that family relationships and activities within the home may enjoy special
constitutional solicitude, it specifically acknowledges that private
association may also occur apart from home and family. Indeed,
only after determining that the "Jaycees are large and basically
unselective groups" and that "the Jaycees [have] failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on [their] freedom of expressive association" did the Roberts Court hold that
Minnesota's antidiscrimination law was constitutional as applied
to that group." 8 The extended conception of privacy respected
by the Court's analysis in Roberts provides what is in our view

1'

468 US 609, 620 (1984).

137

Id.

"

Id at 621, 626.
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the cornerstone
of constitutional security for church autono13 9
my.
Thus far, we are in the domain of privilege untouched by
concerns about protection and equal regard. As we begin to explore more nuanced issues of church autonomy, however, we will
find it necessary to analyze them in terms of both privilege and
protection. Churches are often complex and powerful organizations. In addition to choosing members and leaders, they will
likely engage in economic activity and may sponsor a variety of
institutions, from hospitals to universities to health clubs. The
privacy-based rationale for church autonomy does not afford
equal protection to all these aspects of organized religious activity. On the one hand, for example, decisions about membership
and leadership will enjoy full protection. These actions are closely
analogous to more personal choices about guests and friends.
Absent a guarantee of autonomy vigorous enough to protect the
integrity of such decisions, true communities-be they religious
or companionate-cannot come into being.
On the other hand, when churches offer services and products for sale, their revenues and their decisions about wages and
prices will be subject to the full range of state economic regulation. Commercial transactions, we suggested earlier, are a
quintessentially public mode of interaction. When churches enter
the commercial arena, they take advantage of a market made
possible by the government and specifically entrusted to its care.
Thus, the privacy-based rationale for institutional autonomy
provides no reason to exempt religious manufacturers from the
minimum wage laws. 4 ' Nor does it supply any reason to protect religious merchants from the obligation to collect a sales tax
in connection with the merchandise they sell.'
That does not end the constitutional analysis, of course. It is
precisely at this juncture that equal regard comes to bear upon
church autonomy. The religious manufacturer and religious vendor may still make a constitutional claim for exemptions by invoking the local comparisons sponsored by the principle of equal

" Ira Lupu also treats Roberts as crucial to issues of church autonomy, but he
construes the resulting right much more narrowly than do we. See Lupu, 67 BU L Rev at
433-38 (cited in note 15) (recommending that churches be free to restrict their membership and to deny employment to nonmembers).
140 The Supreme Court so held in Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290,
304-05 (1985).
. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board
of Equalization,493 US 378 (1990).
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regard. But they, unlike the church seeking the freedom to discriminate when choosing its leaders, must depend upon equal
regard because privacy principles do not encompass commercial
claims.
Between these extremes lie a number of more difficult cases.
A church that runs a university or a health club may deny access
to some people for religious reasons-either by restricting participation to church members, or by excluding those nonmembers
who do not conform to theological dictates. Is this analogous to
controlling membership in the church itself? Or is it best regarded as just another facet of church-run commercial activity (assuming that the church charges recipients for the services it provides) subject to general state regulation? Reasonable people will
differ about how to answer these hard questions. A number of
case-specific distinctions may be important. We might wish to
know, for example, whether the religiously run facilities are
intended to turn a profit and, in the case of religiously run universities, whether the curriculum is pervasively sectarian. If we
take our cues from Supreme Court precedent, it would appear
that even in the case of a sectarian university, where one might
think the interest in community especially vigorous, the religious
institution is entitled only to discretionary accommodation (subject, of course, to the constraints of equal regard).,
Cases restricting religious control over the design of church
buildings raise another set of difficult questions. For example,
does the government intrude upon private matters of religious
community when it invokes landmark legislation to prohibit a
church from moving its altar?' One might reasonably think
that it does: the regulation seems constitutionally suspect for the
same reason that we might recoil from a law controlling the bedroom furniture in an architecturally significant family residence.
Homes and churches lose their character as such if control over
internal design is wrested from the communities-familial or
religious-that inhabit them.
142

This principle seems implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones Univer-

sity v United States, 461 US 574, 602-04 (1983) (concluding the government's interest in
achieving racial equality outweighs the burdens that result from denial of tax benefits).
Denying tax benefits to institutions that discriminate is, of course, a less severe measure
than prohibiting them from discriminating entirely; nevertheless, under the theory we
propose, it would be clearly unconstitutional for the government to condition the taxexempt status of churches upon their willingness to select priests without regard to race
or gender.
"' See, for example, Society of Jesus v Boston Landmarks Commission, 409 Mass 38,
564 NE2d 571 (1990) (granting relief pursuant to the Massachusetts state constitution).
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CONCLUSION

Cast in the mold of constitutional privilege, the idea of religious liberty is self-contradictory. The problem is not simply that
religious liberty at its margins may conflict with other constitutional precepts, or even that under the umbrella of religious
liberty we may find subsidiary principles that are at times in
conflict. The problem is deeper than either of these familiar observations. At its core, religious liberty is about the toleration-the celebration-of the divergent ways that members of our
society come to understand the foundational coordinates of a
well-formed life. To single out one of the ways that persons come
to understand what is important in life, and grant those who
choose that way a license to disregard legal norms that the rest
of us are obliged to obey, is to defeat rather than fulfill our commitment to toleration. Yet that favoritism is precisely what the
privileging view of religious liberty requires.
Yet, if the defects of the privileging view are patent, so too
are the conditions that make constitutional solicitude for religion
essential. Religious persecution drove many of the settlers of the
colonies from Europe to America and drove some from their newfound homes in America. Religious discrimination is not merely
an artifact of constitutional history. Within the memory of many
adults, it was a prominent feature of our national landscape, and
it would be far too optimistic to think that we have outgrown the
human impulse to respond badly to the basic differences of culture, habit, and belief that attach to diverse religious faiths. So
while the root infirmity of conferring constitutional privilege on
religious belief has been sufficiently well understood to curb the
Court's enthusiasm for such a privilege, the impulse to preserve
nonmainstream religious belief from hostile or indifferent governmental treatment has had a durable-and deserved-place in
constitutional adjudication. The resulting tension has made a
hash of the jurisprudence of religious accommodation.
The problem lies not with religious liberty but with the paradigm of constitutional privilege and with the principle of unimpaired flourishing that paradigm sponsors. If we replace privilege
with protection and replace unimpaired flourishing with equal
regard, we can rebuild the jurisprudence of religious accommodation. We can make sense of what has seemed scattered precedent,
and we can make religious liberty compatible with its own roots
in toleration-and hence with the whole of our tradition of constitutional liberty.

